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FROM CARTERFONE TO THE iPHONE:
CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE WIRELESS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACE
Michael T. Hoekert
Obituary Ma Bell Dies at 107. Ma Bell died at the stroke of midnight, Saturday, De-
cember 31, 1983. She succumbed to the forces of technological change and the pub-
lic's desire for competition. She was 107 years old. Funeral arrangements were made
by the U.S. Department of Justice's antitrust department team led by William Baxter.
Officiating was Judge Harold H. Greene.'
I. INTRODUCTION
So began a tribute written by the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers Local 1944 upon the divesture, in late 1983, of the largest company
the world had ever seen, the American Telegraph and Telephone Company
("AT&T").2 Tens of thousands of proud men and women could not help but
mourn the loss of the $155 billion telephone empire that they had a very real
hand in constructing. Through the twentieth century, AT&T brought universal
local and long distance telephone service to the United States, a monumental
task by any measure. As a government-sanctioned and vertically integrated
monopoly with universal service as its mandate, AT&T harnessed immense
economies of scale and scope in tackling this challenge.4 By the 1950s, AT&T
t J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
The author would like to recognize Professor Robert Frieden's passion for the issues dis-
cussed here, and thank him for his eagerness to share his knowledge and criticism through-
out the development of this Comment.
I The Day the Bell System Died, http://www.porticus.org/bell/bellsystemdied.html (last
visited Sept. 14, 2008).
2 John S. DeMott, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, TIME, Jan. 16, 1984, at 52. For more on
AT&T, see infra Part II.
3 DeMott, supra note 2, at 53.
4 See AT&T, A Brief History, Post Divestiture, http://www.corp.att.com/history/
history3.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (noting that by the time of divestiture, AT&T had
roughly $150 billion in assets and over 1 million employees). For a history of AT&T, span-
ning from Alexander Graham Bell's early work in the late nineteenth century until the
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controlled the telephone network, exchanges, and service, and produced and
leased all network attachment equipment including telephones themselves.5
The 1968 Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
Carterfone decision was a watershed action that began chipping away at this
telecommunications giant. 6 Carterfone also paved the way for regulations forc-
ing the separation of the sale of wireline telephone service from equipment and
provided consumers the freedom to attach non-harmful third-party devices to
the telephone network.7 FCC or legislative extension of the Carterfone princi-
ples to today's wireless telecommunications industry would be inappropriate,
unjustifiably costly, and potentially harmful.
This Comment begins with an examination of the history and circumstances
in the wireline telecommunications industry that led to the FCC's landmark
Carterfone decision and its progeny. Part III examines current consumer and
academic opinion on the modem wireless telecommunications industry and
introduces the idea of translating Carterfone-style regulation to the wireless
industry. Additionally, Part III provides an overview of ground-breaking new
developments, initiatives and announcements by key players within the wire-
less industry addressing the recent frustrations with restrictive carrier practices
voiced by consumers, academics, and policymakers. Of particular importance
is the FCC's decision to attach open platform requirements, which incorporate
some elements of its Carterfone wireline policy, to broadcast spectrum that
will be vacated upon the 2009 conversion to digital television in the United
States. Against the background of these monumental new developments, Part
IV offers an economic analysis of the changing modem wireless market, illus-
trating that broad-based Carterfone-style FCC regulation at the current inflec-
tion point in the development and deployment of modem wireless technology
is inappropriate.
In Part V, this Comment examines the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") and a key exemption to the DMCA that affects cell phone use. The
exemption legitimizes non-infringing circumvention of wireless carrier soft-
ware controls. It illustrates well-crafted policy that supports consumer choice
and personal property rights at the expense of restrictive carrier practices that
merger with SBC Communications in 2005, see AT&T, A Brief History, Origins,
http://www.corp.att.com/history/historyl.html, and subsequent Web pages.
5 GEORGE S. FORD, THOMAS M. KOUTSKY & LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, WIRELESS NET NEU-
TRALITY: FROM CARTERFONE To CABLE BOXES, PHOENIX CENTER, POLICY BULLETIN No. 17,
at 6 (2007), available at http://www.phoenix-center.org/PolicyBulletin/PCPB 17Final.pdf.
6 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Thomas F.
Carter and Carter Electronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. (Complainants), v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co., Associated Bell System Companies, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest (Defendants), Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (June
26, 1968) [hereinafter Carterfone Decision]; see also Carterfone discussion, infra Part II.
7 See infra Part II.
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serve no intellectual property purpose. This Comment offers evidence that key
carriers within the industry are going well beyond the reach of the DMCA ex-
emption by beginning to take down wireless phone software walls-measures
that will increase innovation and competitiveness.
This Comment concludes by acknowledging the vital role that academic and
consumer sentiment play in bringing about sweeping changes in the wireless
industry. This Comment offers solutions to three potential short-term scenarios
that may emerge from the turbulent state of the wireless industry. These solu-
tions reserve FCC implementation of broad-based Carterfone policy for some
future date, if ever. Finally, this Comment concludes that FCC or legislative
extension of the Carterfone principles throughout today's wireless telecommu-
nications industry would be inappropriate, unjustifiably costly, and potentially
harmful.
II. CARTERFONE AND THE WIRELINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY-A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Throughout the establishment of the national wireline telecommunications
industry in the first half of the twentieth century, AT&T' enjoyed a govern-
ment-sanctioned and regulated monopoly9 for telephone service in the United
States.'" Certain patents obtained by Alexander Graham Bell," popularly re-
garded as the inventor of the telephone, 2 paved the way for what became
known as the "Bell System."' 3 The Bell System was comprised of individual,
8 The company that became AT&T Corporation, formerly known as The American
Telephone & Telegraph Company, traces its roots to 1875 and the work of inventor Alexan-
der Graham Bell and two partners. AT&T, A Brief History, Origins, supra note 4. Bell and
partners initially formed the Bell Telephone Company to exploit Bell's telephone invention.
Id.
9 See AT&T, Milestones in AT&T History, http://www.corp.att.coml/history/
milestones.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (noting that the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment
formalized AT&T's monopoly); AT&T, A Brief History, The Bell System, http://www.
corp.att.com/history/history3.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (noting that Theodore Vail,
president of AT&T in 1907, successfully argued that government regulation can be an "ap-
propriate and acceptable substitute for the competitive marketplace").
10 See AT&T, A Brief History, The Bell System, supra note 9.
1 See Improvement in Telegraphy, U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (filed Feb. 14, 1876),
available at http://www.phonebooth.us/patent/patent image-l.htm; Improvement in Elec-
tromagnetic Telegraphy, U.S. Patent No. 186,787 (filed Jan. 15, 1877); see also United
States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 316 (1888).
12 See Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, http://www.biographi.ca/index-e.html
(search for "Alexander Graham Bell" under "Keyword Search;" then follow "Bell, Alexan-
der Graham" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). Alexander Graham Bell (March 3,
1847-August 2, 1922) was a renowned scientist, inventor, and teacher of the deaf. Id.
'3 Bell and his two partners formed the Bell Telephone Company in 1877 to exploit
Bell's patents by licensing local telephone exchanges to use the Bell trademark and operate
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local circuit-switched telephone networks, operating under license of the Bell
Telephone Company. 4 The American Bell Telephone Company incorporated
AT&T in 1885 as a wholly-owned subsidiary "chartered to build and operate
the original long distance telephone network."' 5 AT&T later purchased the as-
sets of American Bell and became the parent company of the Bell Telephone
System in 1899.16 AT&T's government-sanctioned monopolistic structure fa-
cilitated true universal service-that is, nondiscriminatory interconnection be-
tween independent local exchanges and eventually, a nation-wide telephone
network. 7 In addition to controlling the Bell System, the AT&T conglomerate
owned affiliate company Western Electric, the only producer of telephone
equipment approved by AT&T for use on the network. 8
AT&T controlled access to its wireline network through FCC-sanctioned
"foreign attachment" provisions and tariffs, rules that generally prevented con-
sumers from attaching any equipment, apparatus, circuit, or device not fur-
nished by the telephone company to the telephone system. 9 The recurring rea-
with the new telephone technology. AT&T, A Brief History, Origins, supra note 4. These




17 See MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION,
AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 4-13 (1997). In the
early days of the telephone industry, many local exchanges were owned and operated inde-
pendently from the Bell exchanges. Id. Subscribers of one system could not connect to sub-
scribers of another, even within the same town, whether due to honest technical limitations
or pure operator stubbornness. Id. A major factor behind the U.S. Government's support of
the Bell conglomerate was implementation of nation-wide universal service. Id.
18 Robert W. Hahn, Robert E. Litan, & Hal J. Singer, The Economics of "Wireless Net
Neutrality" 31 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. RP07-
10, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=983111 ("AT&T
owned an equipment company, Western Electric, which manufactured all of the customer
premise equipment for AT&T's customers, including telephone sets and other terminal
equipment."); see also Rob Frieden, Wireless Carterfone: A Long Overdue Policy Promot-
ing Consumer Choice and Competition 4 (New Am. Found., Wireless Future Program,
Working Paper No. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Frieden, Promoting Consumer Choice], available
at http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/wireless carterfone (stating that AT&T
"bundled telephone handset rentals, customer premise inside wiring installations, and main-
tenance and telephone service."). The telephone company actually owned the equipment and
then leased it to consumers. Hahn et al., supra, at 31 n. 107 (quoting ROBERT W. CRANDALL,
AFTER THE BREAKUP: THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY IN A MORE COMPETITIVE
ERA 33-34 (1991)).
19 See In re Jordaphone Corporation of America and Mohawk Business Machines Cor-
poration, Complainants v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, et al., Defendants,
The Electronic Secretary, Inc. and Electronic Secretary Industries, Inc., Telemaster Com-
pany, Daphne Investment Trust, Intervenors; In re Use of Telephone Answering Device in
Connection with Interstate and Foreign Telephone Service, Decision, 18 F.C.C. 644, 9-
11 (May 5, 1954) (quoting various foreign attachment provisions). Pursuant to section
203(a) of the 1934 Telecommunications Act, AT&T enjoyed the right to charge tariffs for
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soning that AT&T advanced for the tariffs was the protection of the network
from the potential harm that unapproved devices and equipment might cause. 0
As an element of AT&T's sanctioned monopoly in the wireline telecommuni-
cations industry, the government tightly regulated rates for AT&T's service
and the lease of all associated telephone equipment to protect consumers.2'
Consequently, AT&T had a profit motive to sabotage and exclude all competi-
tors by exerting control over every facet of network-attaching equipment and
imposing tariffs on non-approved equipment.2 ' These actions raised barriers to
entry in the equipment market, stifled equipment innovation, and limited con-
sumer choice. 3
The FCC's 1968 Carterfone decision was a watershed moment for wireline
telephony and remains the landmark decision that ultimately divested AT&T
of control over attachment of telephone equipment to its network.24 Carterfone
was the sum result of a series of challenges to AT&T's foreign attachment pol-
icy brought by non-AT&T-affiliated entities. The Carterfone decision de-
clared that AT&T's tariffs were "unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful in
its phone service, as well as to implement "classifications, practices, and regulations affect-
ing" its phone service. Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 389, 395 n.12 (2007)
[hereinafter Wu, Wireless Carterfone], http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/152/96;
1934 Telecommunications Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
203(a) (2000)).
20 See Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 395-96.
21 See FORD ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
22 See id. at 7. Sabotage in this context referred to "the ability to increase or raise the
cost of a rival's key input of production by non-price behavior .... Id. Here, the presence
of regulation-specifically rate regulation-facilitated the sabotage. Id.
23 See id. at 5-8. An exception to the popular economic theory that firms vertically inte-
grate to "internalize complimentary efficiencies" ("ICE") has been illustrated by the tele-
communications industry. See generally Joseph Farrell & Phillip J. Weiser, Modularity,
Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and
Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003).
In particular, the Bell System allegedly leveraged its way to market power in comple-
mentary markets, denying equal access to its network to competitors in long distance
and equipment manufacturing. By excluding such competitors, AT&T could rent tele-
phones to its customers and sell equipment from its Western Electric affiliate to its op-
erating companies or telephone subscribers at inflated rates. Such a strategy was avail-
able to AT&T because of its network-level market power, but ICE would claim the op-
tion should be unattractive because it would decrease demand for telephone subscrip-
tion. But that decrease did not deter AT&T because of the price regulation of local
telephone service.
Id. at 106-07 (citation omitted).
24 See Carterfone Decision, supra note 6, at 423.
25 See id. at 420-21; In re Hush-A-Phone Corp. and Harry C. Tuttle, Complainants,
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., et al., Defendants, Decision, 20 F.C.C. 391, 1 1-2
(Dec. 21, 1955), rev'd, Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir.
1956), on remand, In re Hush-A-Phone Corp. and Harry C. Tuttle, Complainants v. Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co., et al., Defendants, Decision and Order on Remand, 22
F.C.C. 112, 3-4 (Feb. 6, 1957).
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the past, and that the provisions prohibiting the use of customer-provided in-
terconnecting devices should accordingly be stricken."26 Carterfone divested
AT&T's power to exert any control over non-harmful network devices and
equipment and eventually led to separation of subscribers' acquisitions of tele-
communications services from the acquisition of telephone handsets, wiring,
and equipment.27 Strengthened through subsequent decisions, rulemaking pro-
ceedings, and technical network interface standards,2" the Carterfone policy
eventually "allowed manufacturers unaffiliated with the Bell System to manu-
facture telephones, under strict technical standards, that consumers could pur-
chase and connect to the telephone network without restriction or additional
fees levied by the phone company."29 The policy and standards articulated in
Carterfone ultimately facilitated third-party development of devices such as
the fax machine, the answering machine, and the modem, all devices that
plugged in to the now-ubiquitous "RJ-1 1" telephone jack." The FCC affirmed
Carterfone in the decades following the decision by declaring the policies
largely effective at serving their intended purpose with minimal adverse ef-
fects."
26 Carterfone Decision, supra note 6, at 423. The FCC stated, "No one entity need pro-
vide all interconnection equipment for our telephone system any more than a single source
is needed to supply the parts for a space probe." Id. at 424. The FCC ultimately held "that
the tariff is unreasonable in that it prohibits the use of interconnecting devices which do not
adversely affect the telephone system." Id. at 423.
27 See Robert Frieden, The Costs and Benefits of Separating Wireless Telephone Ser-
vice from Handset Sales and Imposing Network Neutrality Obligations 13 (Oct. 26, 2007)
[hereinafter Frieden, Costs and Benefits] (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works. bepress.com/ robertfrieden/5.
28 See In re Telerent Leasing Corp. et al. Petition for Declaratory Rulings on Questions
of Federal Preemption on Regulation of Interconnection of Subscriber-Furnished Equipment
to the Nationwide Switched Public Telephone Network, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
45 F.C.C.2d 204, 5 (Jan. 31, 1974), aff'd sub nom., N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d
787 (4th Cir. 1976); In re American Telephone and Telegraph Co.'s Proposed Tariff Revi-
sions in Tariff F.C.C. No. 263 Exempting Mebane Home Telephone Co. of North Carolina
from the Obligation to Afford Customers the Option of Interconnecting Customer-Provided
Equipment to Mebane's Facilities; AT&T Transmittal No. 12-321, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 53 F.C.C.2d 473, 4-5 (May 8, 1975); Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. FCC, 886
F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting long established FCC policy that carriers and non-
carriers alike have a federal right to interconnect to the public telephone network in ways
that are privately beneficial if they are not publicly detrimental); see also 47 C.F.R. pt. 68
(2008) (outlining exhaustive technical standards for telecommunications devices). For a
history of the process from Carterfone to full network attachment rights, see Glen 0. Robin-
son, The Titanic Remembered AT&T and the Changing World of Telecommunications, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 517, 521-32 (1988) (reviewing GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987)).
29 FORD ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
30 See Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 397.
31 See In re Economic Implications and Interrelationships Arising from Policies and
Practices Relating to Customer Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations and Rate Struc-
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III. THE MODERN WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. Reactions to the Current Market
Wireless carriers traditionally have exerted some control over products con-
necting to their systems, although as this Comment will show, the distinctions
from AT&T's wireline control are numerous. Under the standard wireless in-
dustry sales model, the carrier bundles the sale of a contractual service agree-
ment, frequently lasting two years, with a handset made by a third party.32 The
carrier offers the handset, which would otherwise cost hundreds of dollars up-
front, at a deeply discounted price (or even for free) when bundled with a ser-
vice contract.33 The carrier then subsidizes the price of the handset through a
portion of the subscriber's monthly service charge.34 Carriers generally have
not offered discounted service plans, even to subscribers who obtain handsets
elsewhere and therefore do not trigger the need for a handset subsidy.35 Histori-
cally, carriers imposed a stiff early termination fee (often as high as $200)
when a customer cancelled service at any point before fulfillment of the con-
tract term; however, all of the major U.S. carriers now claim to prorate termi-
nation fees.36
The current wide-spread reactions by consumers, affiliated businesses, and
scholars against many of the pricing and operating policies prevalent in today's
wireless phone industry cannot be denied.37 The Wall Street Journal technical
tures, First Report, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 240-41, 255 (Sept. 23, 1976); In re Economic Im-
plications and Interrelationships Arising from Policies and Practices Relating to Customer
Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations and Rate Structures, Second Report, 75 F.C.C.2d
506, 1, 4 (Jan. 9, 1980).
32 See Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 398-99; Frieden, Promoting Con-
sumer Choice, supra note 18, at 6.
33 See Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 398-99 ("Typically, a provider like T-
Mobile or AT&T will advertise and sell a phone for $99-$199 that retails without subsidies
for $300-$600."); see also Wirefly.com, http://www.wirefly.com/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2008) (listing various handsets available for free with service contracts from various carri-
ers).
34 See Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 398-99.
35 See Rob Frieden, Hold the Phone: Assessing the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners
and Carriers 21-22 (Jan. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Frieden, Hold the Phone] (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 1081345.
36 Amol Sharma & Dionne Searcey, Verizon to Open Cell Network to Others' Phones,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2007, at BI (stating that AT&T, Sprint Nextel Corp., Verizon Com-
munications, and T-Mobile USA have all announced they would prorate early termination
fees); see also discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
37 See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, Cellphone Straightjacket Is Inspiring a Rebellion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at C I ("Consumers have never been happy about their cellphone
carriers and the services they provide-or refuse to provide."); Katie Hafner, Sprint Nextel
Settles Lawsuit over Switching to New Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at C4 (summa-
rizing general negative consumer sentiment).
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columnist Walt Mossberg referred to the major cell phone carriers as "Soviet
ministries" because they severed the direct link between producers of goods
and services and consumers.38 Insofar as carriers attempt to replace the market
system, Mossberg states that
[wireless carriers] decide what phones can be used on their networks and what soft-
ware and services can be offered on those phones. They require the hardware and
software makers to tailor their products to meet the carriers' specifications, not just so
they work properly on the network, but so they promote the carriers' brands and their
various add-on services.39
Mossberg compares current high-technology phones to computers, rather
than to the wireline phones of old and contrasts the ease of connecting com-
puter hardware and software via the Internet versus the difficulties inherent in
connecting wireless devices and software via carriers' networks. Mossberg
argues, "[the] mobile phone system.., is the direct opposite of the PC model.
It severely limits consumer choice, stifles innovation, crushes entrepreneur-
ship, and has made the U.S. the laughingstock of the mobile-technology world,
just as the cellphone is morphing into a powerful hand-held computer."40
Professor Robert Frieden,4' who has written extensively on the application of
Carterfone-style regulation to the wireless phone industry, summarized carrier
practices that lead to widespread complaints: handset locking (by frequency
transmission format, firmware, or software) to prevent consumer access to
competitor networks;42 disabling handset functionality to channel consumers to
higher-revenue functions; specifying proprietary formats for accessing handset
memory and creating applications and content to the disadvantage of third-
party developers; and establishing "walled garden" access43 to carrier-favored
38 Free My Phone, http://mossblog.allthingsd.com/20071021/free-my-phone/ (Oct. 21,
2007, 21:31 PST).
39 Id.
40 Id. For more on the state of the U.S. wireless industry in relation to the rest of the
world, see infra note 113.
41 Professor Robert Frieden is the Pioneers Chair in Telecommunications and Professor
of Telecommunications and Law at The Pennsylvania State University. Rob Frieden, http://
comm.psu.edu/faculty/frieden.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
42 Frieden, Hold the Phone, supra note 35, at 17. Generally, the carrier practice of
"locking" a wireless phone occurs when the carrier implements measures on the handset
itself that are designed to allow the handset only to access service and content of that par-
ticular carrier. See Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 399-400. A subscriber, there-
fore, is deterred from easily transferring a locked handset from the initial wireless carrier to
any other carrier.
43 In the context of wireless phones, "walled gardens" refers to carrier efforts to restrict
or direct consumers' access, through software on the phone, to a preferred set of content or
services affiliated with the carrier. See Verizon Takes Down its Garden Walls, http://
blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2007/l1/27/verizon-takes-down-its-garden-walls/ (Nov. 27, 2007,
13:08 EST) (outlining the walled garden problem). The practice is often justified by carriers
as necessary to protect the security of customers' devices and the network, yet also allows
carriers to choose affiliated providers on a revenue-sharing basis. Id.; see also Frieden, Hold
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content of affiliated providers that prevents access to certain third-party con-
tent." These concerns certainly are legitimate. Profit is the common denomina-
tor for such carrier practices. But overarching questions remain: What role, if
any, should the FCC play given the nature of the wireless phone industry and
the fundamental turning point at which the industry currently finds itself?. Will
a largely unregulated, free market structure, where profit-seeking industry
players compete to satisfy consumer choice demands, yield the most efficient
path to maximum technological innovation?
Strong scholarly arguments call on the FCC to impose broad-based Carter-
fone-style regulation on the wireless industry.45 In Wireless Carterfone,46 Co-
lumbia Law School Professor Tim Wu47 outlines four industry problems: (1)
carriers exerting control over network attachments; (2) product design and fea-
ture crippling; (3) bandwidth and contractual restrictions on mobile broadband
services; and (4) excessive burdens and conditions on application entry in the
wireless application market.4"
In response to these problems, Wu offers four major recommendations for
the wireless industry:49 imposition of Carterfone-style attachment rules at a
basic level; a general ban on blocking Internet content; full carrier disclosure
of bandwidth, handset locking, coverage, and rate plan information; and stan-
dardized and open application development." Wu argues that basic Carterfone-
style rules barring the locking of devices to a single carrier and requiring carri-
ers to allow attachment of any compatible and non-harmful network device
would "stimulate the development of new applications and free equipment de-
signers to make the best phones possible."'" Wu also calls for facilitating con-
sumer choice through a ban on carrier blocking of Internet applications and
content, a parallel idea to broadband "network neutrality." 2 Full disclosure of
the Phone, supra note 35, at 18.
44 Frieden, Hold the Phone, supra note 35, at 17.
45 See Frieden, Promoting Consumer Choice, supra note 18; Wu, Wireless Carterfone,
supra note 19; Frieden, Costs and Benefits, supra note 27; Frieden, Hold the Phone, supra
note 35. The New America Foundation released Frieden's working paper, Promoting Con-
sumer Choice, and Frieden appeared as a panelist at the "Free My Phone!" forum held at the
U.S. Senate. New American Foundation, "Free My Phone!," http://www.newamerica.net/
events/2008/free-myphone (last visited Sept. 1, 2008); see also infra note 62.
46 Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19.
47 Tim Wu is a tenured professor of law at Columbia Law School, frequent contributor
to SLATE magazine, and prominent advocate of network neutrality principles. See Columbia
Law School, Full Time Faculty, http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/TimothyWu (last visited
Sept. 1, 2008).
48 Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 389-90.
49 Id. at 391.
50 Id. at 415-18.
51 Id. at 391.
52 Id. "Network neutrality" is a slightly amorphous principle holding, in part, that Inter-
net users, rather than broadband Internet service providers, should control the content and
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any and all limits carriers impose on wireless service would help prevent un-
pleasant post-service contract consumer surprises. 3 Finally, Wu argues that
standardized and open application platforms would stimulate the "stalled"
wireless phone software development environment to the mutual benefit of
consumers and developers."
In Hold the Phone: Assessing the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners and
Carriers,5 Professor Robert Frieden lays out the profit motives behind carri-
ers' historically restrictive handset and service practices. 6 Frieden discusses
prior FCC consumer protection actions in other media contexts that were "de-
signed to protect consumers from incurring higher costs and less flexibility
when attaching equipment and when accessing ICE [information, communica-
tions, and entertainment] content and services."" Frieden acknowledges the
common economic arguments offered against imposing wireless Carterfone
regulation58 but disagrees, positing that the wireless industry is not highly com-
petitive and that this lack of competition enables carriers to engage in anticom-
petitive practices. 9 Articulating his argument on consumer protection and pub-
lic policy grounds,6" Frieden concludes that
the FCC should establish a handset technical certification process that makes it possi-
ble for any handset, operating in the proper format and frequency, to access any carri-
ers' network .... Rather than wait for a consumer revolt, the FCC could adopt a wire-
less Carterfone policy that would place the burden on carriers to explain why their
subscribers should not have the same handset attachment rights as wireline subscrib-
ers have enjoyed for thirty nine years.6'
The work of Wu and Frieden plays a vital role in advancing the national de-
bate on wireless Carterfone policy among consumers as well as in Washing-
applications that other users access. See TimWu.org, Network Neutrality FAQ, http://timwu.
org/networkneutrality.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). The principle calls for preventing
broadband Internet service providers from discriminating against any Internet content via
preventing user access, or restricting the speed of user access, to particular content. Id.
53 Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 417-18.
54 Id. at 391, 418.
55 Frieden, Hold the Phone, supra note 35.
56 Id. at 21-24. Frieden explains how restrictive carrier practices-many of which are
described elsewhere in this section-have been used by carriers to extract profit at the ex-
pense of consumer choice. Id.
57 Id. at 24. Frieden prefaces his argument that the FCC has jurisdiction to implement
Carterfone-style regulation to the wireless industry by explaining in detail prior FCC con-
sumer protection regulation. See id. Specifically, Frieden discusses consumer protection as it
applies to wireless phone local number portability and video program distribution on the
supply side, and prohibiting mandatory cable tier "buy throughs" and mandated alternatives
to cable television set-top boxes on the demand side. See id at 24-51.
58 Id. at 21-24, 55-56. See generally discussion infra Part IV.A (offering an economic
analysis of the wireless telephone market).
59 Frieden, Hold the Phone, supra note 35, at 56-59.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 58-59.
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ton.12 Practically speaking, however, no other recent development in the wire-
less phone industry has brought the issues surrounding carrier control and cell
phone unlocking to the forefront of consumers' minds more than Apple Inc.'s
("Apple") release of the sleek iPhone in the summer of 2007.63
The iPhone saga provides a concise case study of the issues seen in varying
degrees throughout the wireless market. Apple, a company with no network
infrastructure of its own, exclusively partners with carriers in each market
where it sells the iPhonc. 4 For example, in the United States, Apple negotiated
an exclusive five-year contract with AT&T65 and only sells the iPhone handset
bundled with a mandatory two-year AT&T service contract or to already-
existing AT&T wireless customers.66 In fact, Apple requires an AT&T service
contract before a consumer can activate any unique iPhone features, including
non-telephone iPod music player functionality.67 The only exception to Apple's
sales model is in France, where an officially unlocked iPhone is available from
Orange, Apple's chosen provider, due to a French law preventing exclusive
bundling of a wireless handset with service.68 Apple and AT&T have not re-
62 See Frieden, Promoting Consumer Choice, supra note 18; Wu, Wireless Carterfone,
supra note 19; Frieden, Hold the Phone, supra note 35; Michael J. Copps, Commissioner,
Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the New America Foundation Forum: "Free My
Phone!," (Jan. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Statement of Commissioner Copps], available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-27963IAl.pdf. This forum, held at
the Russell Senate Office Building on January, 22, 2008 included a panel discussion on
wireless Carterfone-type regulation between key figures in debate, including Commissioner
Copps, Mossberg, Frieden, and executives from AT&T, T-Mobile, Verizon, and others.
New America Foundation, "Free My Phone" Is Regulation Needed to Ensure Customer
Choice, http://www.newamerica.net/events/2008/free-myphone (last visited Nov. 11,
2008).
63 See generally Apple Store, iPhone 3G, http://store.apple.com/usbrowse/home/
shopiphone/family/iphone?mco=MTE2NTQ (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (offering links to
detailed product information on Apple's iPhone homepage). The iPhone compactly com-
bines wireless phone, iPod music player, wireless and Wi-Fi Internet access, and other high-
technology functionality into one handheld device. Id. The first-generation iPhone officially
went on sale in the United States on June 29, 2007. Press Release, Apple Inc., iPhone Pre-
mieres This Friday Night at Apple Retail Stores (June 28, 2007), available at http://
www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/06/28iphone.html.
64 See Peter Burrows, Inside the iPhone Gray Market, BUS. WK., Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www. businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2008/tc200802 11 152894.htm. As of
Feb. 12, 2008, the iPhone was officially offered for sale in the U.S., Britain, France, and
Germany. Id.
65 Leslie Cauley, iWeapon, USA TODAY, May 22, 2007, at Bi.
66 See The Apple Store, iPhone 3G, supra note 63.
67 Apple Inc., Apple Sales and Refund Policy, http://a248.e.akamai.net/7/248/2041/
1463/store.apple.com/catalog/US/Images/salespolicies.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) ("A
minimum two-year wireless service plan with AT&T is required to activate all iPhone fea-
tures, including iPod features.").
68 See Kevin J. O'Brien, Apple Chooses Orange as iPhone Operator in France, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/16/business/apple.php.
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vealed the exact details of their revenue-sharing arrangement, but analysts es-
timate that AT&T pays Apple anywhere between $10 and $18 per iPhone per
month.69
In addition to raising the consciousness of consumer choice issues through-
out the greater wireless market, the iPhone sales model also has sparked a
prominent gray market for unlocked iPhones. ° Some consumers have filed
lawsuits against AT&T and Apple alleging unfair business practices.7' More
interesting and perhaps more disruptive, however, is the momentum of the
non-litigation challenge to this sales model-what the press has dubbed the
"Mystery of the Missing iPhones" 7-and Apple's reaction to the phenomenon.
Apple reported selling 3.75 million iPhones in 2007, yet AT&T reported acti-
vating fewer than two million of the handsets that year. The media, Wall
Street, and industry analysts were left pondering the exact status of the missing
phones.
Given iPhones that may have been languishing somewhere in Apple's chan-
nel inventory or purchased by consumers but not yet activated,74 no concrete
An iPhone locked to an Orange contract was initially offered for E399 with a two-year ser-
vices contract, and a fully unlocked and "carrier independent" version for E749. Katie Mar-
sal, Apple Prices Unlock iPhone at 749 Euros in France [Updated], APPLEINSIDER, Nov.
28, 2007, http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/07/11/28/appleprices-unlocked-iphones_
at 749_euros in france.html. In Germany, Apple's chosen provider, T-Mobile, briefly sold
an unlocked iPhone for E999 until a German court reversed an injunction requested by Vo-
dafone preventing T-Mobile from exclusively selling the phone with a SIM-card lock and a
two-year T-Mobile service contract. Archibald Preuschat, T-Mobile's Exclusive iPhone
Pacts Upheld, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2007, at B5. The iPhone was previously available for
E399 with a T-Mobile contract. Id.
69 Olga Kharif & Peter Burrows, On the Trail of the Missing iPhones, Bus. WK., Feb.
11, 2008, at 25, 26; Saul Hansell, The $831 iPhone, N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Oct. 25, 2007),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/the-831-iphone. Charles Wolf, an analyst with
Needham & Co., LLC, estimated the payment to Apple at $10. Kharif & Burrows, supra, at
26. Gene Munster, analyst at Piper Jaffray, estimated the average kickback at about $18,
which he derived in part through calculations based on deferred revenue reported on Ap-
ple's financial statements. Hansell, supra. Such estimates put the entire amount that Apple
receives from AT&T per phone during a two-year contract at anywhere from $240 to $432.
Kharif & Burrows, supra, at 26; Hansell, supra.
70 See Cyrus Farivar, Locked vs. Unlocked: Opening Up Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2007, at C9; Mike Elgan, Forget the iPhone, All Phones Should Be "Unlocked," COM-
PUTERWORLD, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=
viewArticleBasic&articleld=9043258; Kharif & Burrows, supra note 69, at 25.
71 Hafner, supra note 37.
72 Kharif& Burrows, supra note 69, at 25.
71 See id
74 See Slash Lane, Unlocked iPhone Sales as High as 40 Percent in Europe-Report,
APPLEINSIDER, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/08/01/28/unlocked_
iphone-sales as high as_40_percent in europereport.html. As of December 31, 2007,
European iPhone sales were estimated to be around 737,000-750,000 units, while activated
European iPhones were estimated to be around 350,000. Id.
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method can accurately determine how many iPhones were sold and then
hacked for use with carriers other than those selected by Apple." Conse-
quently, analysts estimate that the number of iPhones actually unlocked in
2007 ranges from anywhere between 700,000 and one million.76 What the dis-
crepancy suggests, however, is that consumers purchased a significant number
of iPhones in 2007 through legitimate channels and then either unlocked them
for domestic use or shipped them abroad for use in markets where Apple has
not officially offered the iPhone." The consensus is that the bulk of the miss-
ing, unlocked iPhones migrated to markets where Apple has neither chosen a
carrier nor has officially offered the device."8
An iPhone is unlocked through two methods. One involves simple software
programs that allow the iPhone to connect to other carriers' networks. The
other requires installation of a different subscriber identity module ("SIM")
card,79 a hardware alteration that tricks the phone's existing software into un-
75 See Katie Marsal, Piper: Over Half Million "Missing" iPhones Likely in Channel,
APPLEINSIDER, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/08/01/25/piper-over_
halfmillionmissingiphones likelyin channel.html; Kharif & Burrows, supra note 69, at
25-26.
76 See Kharif & Burrows, supra note 69, at 25-26; see also Lane, supra note 74 (esti-
mates by investment bank RBC Capital); Marsal, supra note 75 (estimates by investment
bank Piper Jaffray).
77 See Kharif & Burrows, supra note 69, at 26 ("Most of [the missing iPhones are] trick-
ling into nations around the world where Apple has yet to sign up a local carrier---especially
China."); Saul Hansell, Good News in the One Million Missing iPhones, N.Y. Times Bits
Blog (Jan. 28, 2008), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/good-news-in-the-one-
million-missing-iphones; Damon Darlin, Where Are Those Million iPhones? Everywhere,
N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Jan. 29, 2008), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/where-are-
those-million-iphones-everywhere (including reader comments about the different places
around the world where the iPhone can be purchased on the gray market); Jennifer Lawin-
ski, Where Have All the iPhones Gone?, CHANNELWEB, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.cm.com/
hardware/206106189 ("A stack of about 60 iPhones sat in the office of New York City-
based phone import/export business ... ready to be shipped to a supplier in Hong Kong who
would unlock and then resell them on the gray market in China."); Burrows, Inside the
iPhone Gray Market, supra note 64 ("By the time the device went on sale..., software
hackers and companies that specialize in unlocking cell phones were already searching for
ways to make the iPhone work on nonsanctioned networks."). Reports from news media and
consumers indicate iPhone sales and use in potentially over 100 countries where the device
had not yet been officially released as of early 2008. See generally Kharif & Burrows, supra
note 69; Hansell, supra; Darlin, supra; Lawinski, supra; Burrows, Inside the iPhone Gray
Market, supra note 64.
78 See Burrows, Inside the iPhone Gray Market, supra note 64.
79 A subscriber identity module ("SIM") is a small removable integrated chip card for
Global System for Mobile Communications ("GSM") platform mobile phones which stores
subscriber-identifying data used to authenticate access to the carrier's network. See T-
Mobile Answers, http://search.t-mobile.com/inquiraapp/ui.jsp?uimode=question&question
_box=SIM%2OUnlock (last visited Sept. 16, 2008). GSM, along with Code Division Multi-
ple Access ("CDMA"), are the two major wireless phone standards currently used in the
United States. See WiseGeek, What is the Difference Between GSM and CDMA?,
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knowingly operating on an alternate network."0 The "Mystery of the Missing
iPhones" phenomenon is the economic result of immense consumer demand
for an innovative product early in its life cycle, the point at which the manufac-
turer seeks to extract maximum profit.' This measurable level of "self help"
belies the underlying consumer frustration with locked handsets in general and
with the iPhone in particular. Under Apple's initial iPhone business model, a
significant number of frustrated consumers felt they had no option other than
to evade the system.
In addition to removing their iPhone handsets from the Apple's exclusive
service pacts, consumers have voiced their desire to gain greater control over
the software they run on the devices. 2 Initially, Apple limited the software ap-
plications that the device would run only to those developed by Apple itself.83
Apple took the stance that it needed to limit third party applications to protect
the security of devices and the network.84 Regardless, third parties successfully
wrote software applications that found widespread use on the device, with
some reports indicating that hundreds of "underground" programs existed.85
Apple immediately responded through an iPhone software update that it re-
leased in September 2007.86 When a consumer installed the update on an
iPhone that had been hacked or unlocked, the update erased third-party soft-
ware, and in some cases actually rendered the altered handset useless or
"bricked."87 Software hackers then began a game of tug-of-war by releasing a
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-difference-between-gsm-and-cdma.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2008).
80 See, e.g., Peter Burrows, iPhone's Reluctant Gray Marketer, Bus. WK., Feb. 12,
2008, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2008/tc20080212_636668.htm.
When certain SIM cards are inserted into certain GSM phones, the card provides authentica-
tion and the phone's software allows the device to connect to an alternate carrier's network.
See id.
81 See Burrows, Inside the iPhone Gray Market, supra note 64.
82 The iPhone combines the hardware elements of a small computer with Wi-Fi connec-
tivity, a camera, a music player, and a cellular telephone. See Apple Store, iPhone 3G, supra
note 63. The potential for software applications on a device with such functionality are im-
mense.
83 Prince McLean, iPhone to Support Third-Party Web 2.0 Applications, APPLEINSIDER,
June 11, 2007, http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/07/06/11/iphone-to-support third_
party_ web 2_0 applications.html. However, upon shipment, the iPhone could run non-
standalone Web 2.0 applications within its Web browser. Id.
84 See Tom Krazit, Apple's Jobs Says Third-Party iPhone Apps Coming in February,
CNET NEWS, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-13579_3-9798932-37.html.
85 See John Boudreau, iPhone Developer's Kit Expected Soon, NEWS FACTOR NET-
WORK, Feb. 26, 2008 (on file with author).
86 See Arik Hesseldahl, Apple Clamps Down on iPhone Hacking, Bus. Wk. Byte of the
Apple Blog (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ByteOfTheApple/
blog/archives/ 2007/09/apple clamps_do.html.
87 See Bruce Schneier, With iPhone, "Security" Is Code for "Control, " WIRED, Feb. 7,
2008, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/02/security
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program that overcame Apple's update and that continued to facilitate unlock-
ing and the use of third-party software.88 However, hacking is far from the only
way that consumers have dealt with their mobile phone frustration.
B. The Changing Landscape of the Wireless Telecommunications Industry
1. Consumer Litigation
Consumer frustration with the traditional mobile phone sales model in the
United States has led to significant litigation, largely against carriers. For ex-
ample, subscribers filed class action suits in California against wireless phone
carrier T-Mobile"9 that were consolidated on appeal in Gatton v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc.9" Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against T-Mobile's collec-
tion or enforcement of the $200 early termination fee that T-Mobile charged
consumers regardless of the reason for terminating their service contracts91 and
for recovery of collected past termination fees.92 Plaintiffs also challenged T-
Mobile's practice of locking its handsets to prevent subscribers from switching
to another carrier without purchasing a new handset; they sought an order to
compel T-Mobile to unlock phones free of charge and an injunction against
such future behavior.
93
T-Mobile moved to compel arbitration, claiming that the arbitration clauses
in its subscriber agreements constituted waiver of class action suits.94 Plaintiffs
matters 0207. "Bricked" refers to the result of the update on some unlocked handsets-
essentially, a sleek and very expensive brick. See id.
88 See Posting of Erica Sadun to Tuaw, The Unofficial Apple Weblog, Instant Jailbreak
for iPhone and iPod Touch, http://www.tuaw.com/2007/10/29/instant-jailbreak-for-iphone-
and-ipod-touch (Oct. 29, 2007, 00:35 EST); Robert McMillan, Apple iPhone Update Fixes
Security Bug, PC WORLD, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/139562/
apple-iphone _updatefixessecurity bug.html; Burrows, Inside the iPhone Gray Market,
supra note 64; see also Burrows, iPhone's Reluctant Gray Marketer, supra note 80.
89 See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 347 n.l (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(discussing the "Cellphone Termination Fee Cases"). T-Mobile, headquartered in Bonn,
Germany, is a network operator and wholly-owned subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom; T-
Mobile USA is its U.S. operating entity. Deutsche Telekom, Global Player on the Mobile
Communications Market, http://www.telekom.com/dtag/cms/content/dt/en/530494 (last
visited Sept. 17, 2008).
90 Gatton, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 344.
91 Id. at 349. T-Mobile has since implemented pro-rated termination fees. See Sharma &
Searcey, supra note 36.
92 Gatton, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 344.
93 Id. at 349. T-Mobile operates under the GSM standard, which utilizes SIM card tech-
nology. See id. The SIM card is easily swappable by a consumer from phone to phone; how-
ever, T-Mobile uses a software lock within the phone that only allows the phone to work
with a different SIM card if an eight-digit code is entered into the phone. Id.
94 Id. at 347 n.3, 349.
2008]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
argued that the arbitration clause, buried within the service agreements, was
unconscionable and unenforceable, and further that arbitration was not appro-
priate due to the important public policy issues at stake.95 A California trial
court denied T-Mobile's motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded
that plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief were primarily for public benefit, not
subject to arbitration, and that the subscriber agreement arbitration clauses
were "substantively unconscionable because [their] prohibition on class arbi-
trations or participation in a class action was against public policy."'96 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals affirmed, the California Supreme Court denied T-
Mobile review without comment,97 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied T-
Mobile's petition for certiorari, clearing the way for the case to be heard on the
plaintiffs' claims in the lower court.98
In light of recent developments, the T-Mobile suit likely will settle in favor
of consumers, and the end of flat termination fees appears certain. In June
2008, the FCC held a hearing on early termination fees where Chairman Kevin
Martin recognized the issue and stated that the Commission will examine in-
dustry practices and developments to determine the best way to address it.99 In
July 2008, prior to any published findings by the FCC, a California judge in
separate litigation issued a ruling finding Sprint Nextel's early termination fees
illegal and ordered the carrier to pay $18.2 million in fees back to consumers."°
Similarly, early termination fee cases brought against Verizon Wireless settled
out of court in early July 2008 for a reported $21 million.' °'
The California courts have demonstrated a strong pro-consumer sentiment
throughout the major termination fee and unlocking litigation. Chairman Mar-
95 Id. at 349 (noting that the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration on these
grounds).
96 Id. at 349-50. Implicit in the court's denial to compel arbitration is a suggestion that
subscriber agreements, at least to some extent, contain substance more akin to contracts of
adhesion than to the requisite "meeting of the minds."
97 Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), review
denied (Oct. 10, 2007).
98 See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Gatton, 128 S. Ct. 2501 (2008); see also David Kravets,
Court Clears Way for Mobile-Phone-Unlocking Lawsuit Against T-Mobile, WIRED, Oct. 11,
2007, http:// www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/10/tmobile.
99 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Announces Further Details of Public
Hearing on Early Termination Fees (June 10, 2008), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attachmatch/DOC-282867A].pdf; Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n., Remarks on Early Termination Fees (June 12, 2008),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-282898A I .pdf.
100 Posting of Andrew R. Hickey to ChannelWeb, http://www.crn.com/retail/209900617
(July 30, 2008, 15:48 PDT).
101 W. David Gardner, Verizon Wireless Settles Early Termination Fee Case for $21
Million, INFORMATIONWEEK, July 10, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/
telecom/regulation/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=20880843 1.
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tin has also stated that a goal of the FCC is consumer protection. 2 Such costly
litigation and publicity has added to the pressure on carriers to revamp their
overall policies and business practices throughout the U.S. mobile phone in-
dustry."3 In fact, as early as November 2007, the New York Times reported that
T-Mobile would offer the unlock code for a customer's handset after their ac-
count had been active for ninety days."° AT&T informed the New York Times
that it would unlock a customer's handset after fulfillment of all contract terms
and that it would "sell customers an unlocked phone at full price-with the
exception of the iPhone."' 5 Likely as proactive responses to threats of gov-
ernment regulation and to termination fee litigation, AT&T, ° Sprint Nextel, °7
T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless' now all claim to prorate service contract
termination fees."°
Indeed, carriers have already ceded to consumer demands following similar
suits by customers. As part of a settlement in a different class action suit in a
California court, Sprint Nextel offered to give customers, who properly leave
the carrier's service, the code needed to unlock their handsets' software and
take the handsets to competitors' networks."' The New York Times reported
Sprint said it would share the unlocking code with all current and former sub-
scribers once they had completed the terms of their contracts, had their phones deacti-
vated and paid their final bills.
The company will also add information about the unlocking codes as part of the
102 See Martin, Remarks on Early Termination Fees, supra note 99.
103 See, e.g., id. (outlining consumer protections that rules would guarantee if the FCC
takes jurisdiction over early termination fees).
104 Farivar, supra note 70.
lo5 Id.
106 AT&T Mobility LLC, formerly Cingular Wireless LLC, is the wholly-owned wireless
operator subsidiary of AT&T Inc. and is the largest United States wireless carrier in number
of subscribers with more than 72.9 million. See Wireless from AT&T, About Us, http://
www.wireless.att.com/about (last visited Sept. 17, 2008); cf Verizon Wireless, About Us
Overview, http://aboutus.vzw.com/ aboutusoverview.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2008) (stat-
ing Verizon Wireless has 70.8 million subscribers).
107 Sprint Nextel Corp. formed in 2005 when Sprint acquired Nextel for $35 billon and is
the third largest wireless communications operator in the United States with nearly 52 mil-
lion customers. Matt Sedensky, Sprint, Nextel Complete Their $35 Billion Merger, USA
TODAY, Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2005-08-15-
sprintnextel x.htm; Sprint Nextel Corp., About Sprint Nextel, http://www2.sprint.com/mr/
aboutsprint.do (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
108 Verizon Wireless is a joint venture between Verizon Communications Inc. and Voda-
fone Group, and is the second largest U.S. wireless provider by subscribers, with 70.8 mil-
lion customers. Verizon Wireless, About Us Overview, http://aboutus.vzw.com/
aboutusoverview.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
109 Sharma & Searcey, supra note 36.
110 Hafner, supra note 37; Farivar, supra note 70. The settlement terms would allow any
former Sprint Nextel CDMA-platform phone to be used on any other CDMA network, such
as Verizon and AlItel. Hafher, supra note 37.
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terms and conditions of service given to new customers and will instruct its customer
service representatives on connecting a non-Sprint phone to the Sprint network."'
In response to the proposed settlement, telecommunications industry analyst
Edward Snyder said it indicated "the control that wireless carriers in the United
States had historically wielded over customers was beginning to erode."" 2
Snyder elaborated it was "a step in the direction of opening up the possibility
of letting people own their own phone and use it with the carrier they want.
Over the next two or three years we'll see the U.S. carriers go the way of the
European market.""'
2. Major Openness Initiatives
To avoid litigation and likely to capture greater market share, cell phone
companies such as Apple have attempted to curb consumer dissatisfaction by
providing the public with more control over cell phone features and functional-
ity. Just as the consumer backlash against Apple and AT&T's initial iPhone
business model highlights key consumer choice issues in the wireless industry,
Apple's response illustrates a device manufacturer's moves to capture greater
market share by giving consumers and third-party software developers greater
access to and control over a wireless device. In October 2007, less than four
months after the iPhone went on sale, Apple CEO Steve Jobs wrote on Apple's
Developer Web site that the company planned to introduce an iPhone software
development kit ("SDK") and open the device to third-party software develop-
ers around the end of February 2008."' Jobs said that the reason for Apple's
delay in offering an SDK was to give the company time to determine how to
"provide an advanced and open platform to developers while at the same time
protect iPhone users from viruses, malware, privacy attacks, etc.""' 5 Akin to
I Hafner, supra note 37.
112 ld
113 Id. (quoting Edward Snyder). In Europe, consumers can generally buy most wireless
handsets either directly from manufacturers at full price (giving them a choice of carriers) or
at subsidized prices from carriers; although in practice, over 95% of Europeans buy handsets
through the carrier just as U.S. consumers do. Cassell Bryan-Low, Loretta Chao & Jane
Spencer, How Open Cell Networks Work in Asia, Europe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007, at
B1. In Asia, however, about 80% of cell phones are sold independently of a carrier. Margue-
rite Reardon, Will "Unlocked Cell Phones" Free Consumers?, CNET NEWS, Jan. 24, 2007,
http://news.cnet.com/Will-unlocked-cell-phones-free-consumers/2100-1039_3-6152735.
html?tag=st.prev.
114 Krazit, supra note 84. A software development kit ("SDK") is typically a set of de-
velopment tools that allow one to create software applications for a certain software or
hardware platform. See WebSphere Software Information Center, http://publib.boulder.ibm.
com/infocenter/adiehelp/index.jsp?topic=/com.ibm.wsinted.glossary.doc/topics/glossary.
html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
115 Id.
[Vol. 17
Wireless Telecommunication Consumer Choice
AT&T's wireline network protection argument, wireless Carterfone propo-
nents often frame such network security concerns by a wireless hardware
manufacturer or carrier as, at least to some extent, a faqade for refusal to con-
cede to the consumer choice argument." 6 Yet often, as with the iPhone, carriers
and handset-makers have legitimate concerns for ensuring strong security
against malicious programs and users. As wireless phone technology advances,
the danger of malicious software also increases, especially for a popular device
like the iPhone that handles sensitive user information."
7
Despite these concerns and challenges, Apple remained on target and re-
leased the free beta version of its SDK on March 6, 2008, giving third-party
developers the tools needed to create and certify standalone software applica-
tions for the iPhone."' Within four days of the March 6 launch, iPhone SDK
downloads topped 100,000."' The iPhone will remain tied exclusively to the
AT&T wireless network for at least its first five years on the market, but the
iPhone SDK will add further momentum to the transformation of the wireless
handset into a portable, full-function, open access hand-held computer. 2 ' Ac-
cording to Kang-Heui Cha, executive at South Korean mobile phone manufac-
turer LG Electronics Inc., Apple and Google "have immense global influence.
With their appearance, we can expect to have a lot more competition in the
[wireless] industry."'
12'
Internet search engine, web application, and online advertising giant Google
Inc. 12  ("Google") announced in early November 2007 the Open Handset Alli-
116 See Frieden, Promoting Consumer Choice, supra note 18; Wu, Wireless Carterfone,
supra note 19.
117 See Krazit, supra note 84.
118 Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple Announces iPhone 2.0 Software Beta (Mar. 6,
2008), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/03/O6iphone.html?sr-hotnews;
see Antone Gonsalves, Apple Set to Release iPhone Developer Kit, INFORMATIONWEEK,
Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/business/showARticle.
jhtml?articlelD=206900627; Katherine Boehret, Apple's Updates for the iPhone and iPod
Touch, WALL ST. J., Jan 23, 2008, at D3. See generally iPhone Developer Program,
http://developer.apple.com/iphone/programs (last visited Sept. 19, 2008); iPhone Dev Cen-
ter, http://developer.apple.com/iphone/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
119 Press Release, Apple Inc., iPhone SDK Downloads Top 100,000 (Mar. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/03/12iphone.html.
120 See Cassell Bryan-Low, Apple, Google Are Driving Big Changes for Cellphones,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at B3A.
121 Bryan-Low et al., supra note 113 (quoting Kang-Heui Cha).
122 Google, headquartered in Mountain View, CA, was founded in 1998 and has a market
capitalization of over $157 billion. Google.com, Corporate Information, http://www.google.
com/intl/en/corporate/history.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2008); WSJ.com, Key Facts for
Google Inc., http://online.wsj.com/quotes/keyfacts.html?mod=2 0470&symbol=GOOG&
news-symbol=GOOG (last visited Sept. 17, 2008). The software giant offers an ever-
expanding gamut of free, largely Internet-based software upon which it sells advertising
space. See Google.com, Google Press Center: Product Descriptions, http://www.google.
com/intl/en/press/descriptions.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
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ance ("OHA"), a consortium of mobile carriers, handset makers, semiconduc-
tor manufacturers, software developers, and commercialization companies
working collaboratively to turn mobile phones into hand-held computers.'
Given the size and strength of the companies involved, OHA could yield the
largest and most dramatic change to the wireless phone industry in its history.
OHA handsets will offer a wide variety of new applications and services
centered on a new open-source operating platform named "Android."'24 A T-
Mobile executive commented that "Android is a breakthrough because it gives
software developers access to information they didn't have before, including a
user's location, communications history, contact list and 'presence,' a signal of
whether someone's phone is on or off."'25 Handset makers in the alliance in-
clude Samsung, Motorola, and LG, and major carriers include China Mobile,
Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, Telecom Italia, and Telef6nica' 26
A major goal of the OHA is to spur innovation in the content and functional-
ity offered on wireless phones by providing carriers, handset makers, and soft-
ware developers with free use of the Android platform.'27 In theory, such a free,
open-source platform will substantially reduce the cost and increase the ability
and freedom of third-parties to develop fully-integrated applications that take
complete advantage of handset hardware capabilities. In particular, Google's
push for Android comes in large part from its desire to overcome the trouble it
has encountered in getting its growing portfolio of Web-based applications
(such as its search engine, maps, e-mail, documents, and books) around carri-
ers' "walled gardens"'28 and into an easy-to-use mobile phone format.'29
Google released an early version of the Android SDK to developers within a
week of the OHA announcement. 3° Less than a week after the announcement,
123 Press Release, Google Inc., Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for Mobile
Devices (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.google.com/intI/en/press/pressrel/
20071105_mobile open.html; Open Handset Alliance, http://www.openhandsetalliance.com
(last visited Sept. 17, 2008); see Kevin J. Delaney & Amol Sharma, Google, Bidding for
Phone Ads, Lures Partners, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Delaney &
Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads].
124 See Press Release, Google Inc., supra note 123; see also Delaney & Sharma, Bidding
for Phone Ads, supra note 123. At inception, the Open Handset Alliance comprised thirty-
four founding members, including Google. Press Release, Google Inc., supra note 123.
125 Delaney & Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads, supra note 123 (quoting Cole Brodman,
T-Mobile chief development officer).
126 Id.; Press Release, Google Inc., supra note 123.
127 Delaney & Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads, supra note 123; Press Release, Google
Inc., supra note 123.
128 See Delaney & Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads, supra note 123; Verizon Takes
Down its Garden Walls, supra note 43.
129 See Delaney & Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads, supra note 123.
130 Press Release, Open Handset Alliance, Open Handset Alliance Releases Android
SDK (Nov. 12, 2007), available at http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press1I 11207.
html.
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prototype Android-powered handsets were in use on an advanced high-speed
wireless network operating under an FCC test license at Google's Mountain
View, California headquarters. 3' Various Open Handset Alliance microchip
manufacturers demonstrated prototype devices running on Android software at
the World Mobile Congress in Barcelona, Spain in February 2008.32 There,
Texas Instruments showed a prototype handset with "one-button" access to
Web browsing, email, messaging, and video.'33 Texas Instruments reiterated
the position that "increased audio, video and global-positioning functions and a
better Web-surfing experience will drive handset sales."'34 In October 2008, T-
Mobile launched the GI, the first Android-powered wireless handset available
to consumers.'35 A CNET News review revealed that while this particular
handset had some design deficiencies, the real ground-breaking news lay in the
Android platform itself: "There's huge potential for [Android powered phones]
to become powerful minicomputers as developers create more applications for
the open platform .... [W]e're excited about Google Android and feel it could
change the way we use smartphones." '36
Google's entry into the wireless phone market poses the possibility of dras-
tically cheaper phones with the capability of accessing advanced Internet func-
tionality. Google executives hope to take its very successful online advertising
concept to mobile phones by having ads show up on a phone similar to how
they appear while one surfs the Web.'37 Google executives indicate this is cur-
rently "the company's biggest business opportunity."'3 Specifically, the impli-
cations of Google marrying its ad-based business model with the highly spe-
cific user data that Android software could provide are immense for targeted
131 Kevin J. Delaney & Amol Sharma, Google Has Even Bigger Plans for Mobile
Phones, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2007, at B1 [hereinafter Delaney & Sharma, Bigger Plans for
Mobile Phones].




135 Jonathan Skillings, T-Mobile Delivers the GJ (AKA Android) Phone, CNET NEWS,
Oct. 22, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/t-mobile-delivers-the-gl-aka-android-phone.
136 Bonnie Cha & Nicole Lee, HTC Dream T-Mobile GJ (Black), CNET REVIEWS, Oct.
15, 2008, http://reviews.cnet.com/htc-dream-t-mobile-gl.
137 Delaney & Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads, supra note 123. The Android platform
includes "several layers of software" such as "an operating system, a user interface and
applications such as advanced Web-browsing software." Id. Google hopes that easier Inter-
net access will spur wider use of its software on wireless phones, allowing the company to
seize additional ad revenue. Id. Google generates revenue "by providing advertisers with the
opportunity to deliver measurable, cost-effective online advertising that is relevant to the
information displayed on any given [Web] page." Google.com, Corporate Information,
Company Overview, http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/index.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2008).
138 Delaney & Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads, supra note 123.
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advertising. Ultimately, this access creates an incentive for Google to expand
the availability and decrease the cost of high-speed mobile Internet service
while promoting development of mobile phone applications and functional-
ity.'39 If Google does not build and operate a wireless network itself, it would
likely share wireless phone advertising revenue with the carrier. The carrier
could then increase competitiveness by subsidizing lower-cost handsets and
wireless service through ad revenue instead of through a customer's monthly
service fees. 4 ° Another option for Google is to use ad revenue to experiment
with new methods of charging for service. For example, a carrier could drop
monthly services fees altogether and instead charge consumers a one-time li-
censing fee to access its network. 4 '
In a surprising move that could also create "a major shift for the mobile
phone industry,"'42 Verizon announced its open development initiative, "Any
Apps, Any Device" on November 27, 2007.' 4 Facing increasing pressure from
regulators, consumers, and rivals, the company announced that it will offer
"the option to use, on its nationwide wireless network, wireless devices, soft-
ware and applications not offered by the company" to its customers throughout
the United States by the end of 2008.' In language that parallels wireline Car-
terfone requirements,'45 Verizon stated
In early 2008, the company will publish the technical standards the development
community will need to design products to interface with the Verizon Wireless net-
work. Any device that meets the minimum technical standard will be activated on the
network. Devices will be tested and approved in a $20 million ... testing lab[,] which
received an additional investment this year to gear up for the anticipated new demand.
Any application the customer chooses will be allowed on these devices. 1
46
139 Delaney & Sharma, Bigger Plans for Mobile Phones, supra note 131. A Google
spokesman stated, "Our goal is to make sure that American consumers have more choices in
an open and competitive wireless world." Id.
140 Delaney & Sharma, Bidding for Phone Ads, supra note 123.
141 Delaney & Sharma, Bigger Plans for Mobile Phones, supra note 131.
142 Laura M. Holson, Verizon Plans Wider Options for Cell Users, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28,
2007, at Al. The move surprised industry experts since Verizon was "known to be highly
protective of its traditional business model." Id.
143 Press Release, Verizon Wireless, Verizon Wireless to Introduce "Any Apps, Any
Device" Option for Customers in 2008 (Nov. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Verizon Any Apps, Any
Device], available at http://news.vzw.com/ news/2007/11 /pr2007-11-27.html.
144 Id. Verizon operates on the CDMA network standard, which means that GSM devices
designed for networks used by T-Mobile and AT&T, including the current iPhone, are not
capable of connecting to Verizon's network regardless of the initiative. Holson, Verizon
Plans Wider Options for Cell Users, supra note 142. Sprint Nextel and Alltel are other ma-
jor CDMA carriers. Hafter, supra note 37.
145 Carterfone Decision, supra note 6, at 424.
146 Verizon Any Apps, Any Device, supra note 143. In March 2008, Verizon hosted a
development conference where it presented these technical standards for the first time to
third-party device developers. Press Release, Verizon Wireless, Verizon Wireless to Host
Open Development Conference March 19-20, 2008 in New York City (Jan. 22, 2008),
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While hardware will need certification by Verizon itself to operate on its
network, "programmers will be able to develop software [via an SDK] to run
on the phones without authorization from the company."'' 7 Verizon President
and Chief Executive Officer Lowell McAdam stated that the company is seek-
ing to deliver "the next level of innovation and growth" through this "network-
only" service offering. 4 Verizon acknowledged that a "small but growing
number of customers" have demanded an alternative to the traditional wireless
phone sales and service model.'49
This initiative indicates that Verizon sees an avenue for additional profit and
growth by satisfying consumer demand for greater choice.' When one carrier
strengthens its competitive advantage by giving consumers and developers
control over devices and software, market forces will require others to follow.
Though the plan won praise from Google, Microsoft, and the FCC,'' consumer
advocates rightly caution that while the Any Apps, Any Device initiative is
commendable, its true impact on expanding consumer choice is uncertain until
Verizon releases complete details on pricing and the full parameters of its in-
house testing system.'52 Verizon's $20 million investment in the testing lab,
however, demonstrates the company's stake in the success of the initiative, and
the company claims that its minimum technical requirements for devices will
not be burdensome.'53 Perhaps most groundbreaking from a consumer stand-
available at http://news.vzw.com/news/2008/01/pr2008-01-22b.html.
147 Holson, Verizon Plans Wider Options for Cell Users, supra note 142.
148 Verizon Any Apps, Any Device, supra note 143.
149 Id. Whether for marketing purposes or otherwise, Verizon has recently taken pro-
consumer stances, for example: the introduction of pro-rated termination fees in 2006, its
refusal to participate in a wireless phone number directory, and eventual (although not ini-
tial) support of wireless phone number portability. Id.; see Verizon Wireless Sees No Fee to
Keep Phone Numbers, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/
2003-06-24-verizon-number-port x.htm. AT&T, Sprint Nextel, and T-Mobile subsequently
all responded to threatened government regulation by following Verizon's move in pro-
rating service contract termination fees that used to run as high as $200. Sharma & Searcey,
supra note 36.
150 See Verizon Any Apps, Any Device, supra note 143 ("Verizon Wireless is not chang-
ing [its] successful retail model, but rather adding an additional retail option for customers
looking for a different wireless experience." (quoting Lowell McAdam)).
151 See Holson, Verizon Plans Wider Options for Cellphone Users, supra note 142.
152 Id. Gene Kimmelman, vice president for federal affairs at Consumers Union, an ad-
vocacy group, said the Any Apps, Any Device initiative is "a step in the right direction." Id.
When Verizon announced the initiative, it did not provide details on pricing other than that
data charges would be based on usage-a commodity method. Sharma & Searcey, supra
note 36. It would not be surprising if Verizon, at least initially, charged a premium for net-
work-only service (a bring-your-own phone plan) versus its comparable traditional service.
See Dionne Searcey, Verizon 's Opening Move and You, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2007, at D l
(noting that analysts expect Verizon to charge more for network-only service).




point, Verizon will not require customers pursuing its Any Apps, Any Device
offering to sign traditional service contracts.'54
Provided Verizon's technical standards are not unduly burdensome and pric-
ing is competitive, the Any Apps, Any Device initiative could radically alter
the traditional wireless phone landscape and present an opportunity for device
manufacturers seeking entry to the U.S. market. 5 At the November 2007 an-
nouncement of the initiative, Verizon made its hopes of the initiative clear:
"electronics manufacturers will create a variety of devices for its open net-
work, such as notebook computers with wireless broadband, personal music
devices, digital cameras, electronic book readers and portable gaming
systems . . . [and] even kitchen appliances [will be] linked to the company's
network one day."'
56
On the likely pressure that this initiative could put on Verizon's competitors,
Roger Entner of marketing firm JAG Research said that "[i]f they don't change
their own business model, someone else will do it for them.' 57 Cyriac Roed-
ing, director of Mobile Content Efforts for CBS, said, "This is only going to
drive innovation for consumers, which is a good thing."'58 If successful, Veri-
zon's Any Apps, Any Device initiative would throw the spotlight back on soft-
ware developers and device manufacturers who have traditionally balked at
carriers' restrictive practices, giving them the chance to display their innova-
tive capabilities.'59
A Wired Magazine blog stated that the Verizon Any Apps, Any Device ini-
tiative "is perhaps the strongest evidence to date that the mobile industry as a
whole is undergoing a fundamental shift in the way it approaches openness,
both from a network and a device perspective." 6' David Farber, professor of
computer science and public policy at Carnegie Mellon's School of Computer
Science and an outspoken proponent of open access, is more critical of Veri-
zon's initiative, seeing it as essentially a forced public relations response to
Google's Android and OHA and Apple's iPhone SDK.6' Yet Farber admits
Verizon's move is a "step in the right direction" and a reaction "to competitive
pressure and an industry that is increasingly moving toward openness." '62 The
software element of Verizon's Any Apps, Any Device initiative is sure to lead
1i4 Id.
155 Id.
156 Sharma & Searcey, supra note 36.
157 Holson, Verizon Plans Wider Options for Cell Users, supra note 142.
158 Id.
159 See id
160 Posting of Brian Gardiner to Wired.com Epicenter Blog, Pigs Fly, Hell Freezes Over
and Verizon Opens Up Its Network-No, Really, http:/Iblog.wired.com/business/2007/1 1/
verizon-opens-u.html (Nov. 27, 2007, 14:48 EST) [hereinafter Gardiner, Pigs Fly].
161 See id.; see also discussion supra Part III.B.2 (explaining Apple's SDK).
162 Gardiner, Pigs Fly, supra note 160.
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to a meaningful impact on the applications available to consumers as third par-
ties will finally have unrestricted creative freedom, at least within the limits of
the SDK. However, the true effect of the hardware component remains ques-
tionable because Verizon will determine if devices are approved for use on the
company's network.
3. The 700 MHz Spectrum Action
Verizon and Google, two titans with distinct approaches to next-generation
wireless technology, locked homs directly in the 700 MHz spectrum auction,
which began on January 24, 2008.163 The FCC held the auction to allocate
broadcast spectrum that will become available following the transition to digi-
tal television on February 17, 2009."6 The ability of the 700 MHz band to carry
data efficiently, by traveling well through buildings and over long distances
and ultimately requiring fewer costly transmission towers, made the band one
of the most valuable spectrum bands ever auctioned.'65 These characteristics
will allow 700 MHz licensees to deploy robust, high-bandwidth networks at
lower costs. Within the 700 MHz spectrum, and of particular interest to wire-
less carriers and open network advocates alike, was a group of twelve regional
spectrum licenses known collectively as the C Block."6 Google and Voice over
163 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses I
(Jan. 14, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/ DA-08-
83Al.pdf; W. David Gardner, FCC 700 MIHz Auction Tops $18.8 Billion, INFORMATION
WEEK, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.infornationweek.com/news/management/showArticle.
jhtml?articlelD=206103868.
164 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands; Revision of
the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible
Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review-Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and 90 to
Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services; Former
Nextel Communications, Inc. Upper 700 Mhz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part
27 of the Commission's Rules; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Pub-
lic Safety Network in the 700 Mhz Band; Development of Operational, Technical and Spec-
trum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications
Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement under
Commission's Part I Anti-Collusion Rule, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289,
1 (July 31, 2007) [hereinafter 700 MHz Report and Order]; see also Corey Boles, FCC
Auction May Expand Cellphone Options, Services, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at D9.
165 Amol Sharma & Amy Schatz, AT&T, Verizon in Airwaves Grab; A Win for Google?,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2008, at B1; Delaney & Sharma, Bigger Plans for Mobile Phones,
supra note 131; Corey Boles, Bidding Set to Begin for Wireless Spectrum, WALL ST. J., Jan.
24, 2008, at B6.
166 The "C Block" refers to the group of twelve licenses for spectrum in the upper 700
MHz band. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Revises 700 MHz Rules to Ad-
vance Interoperable Public Safety Communications and Promote Wireless Broadband De-
ployment (July 31, 2007) [hereinafter FCC Revises 700 MHz Rules], available at http://
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Internet Protocol ("VoIP") company Skype Communications S.A.R.L.
("Skype"),'67 among others, lobbied fervently for the FCC to impose open ac-
cess requirements on the C Block spectrum licenses.'68 Google urged the FCC
to adopt four basic open access principles on the C Block licenses-"open ap-
plications, open devices, open services, and open networks.'
69
Separately, Skype filed a petition for rulemaking with the FCC in February
2007 asking the Commission to "declare wireless services are subject to Car-
terfone principles" and requesting specifically that "consumers have the right
to attach any non-harmful device of their choice to the network and run Inter-
net applications of their own choosing" on those devices. 7 ° The FCC has not
directly responded to the Skype petition, but it often has recognized that mar-
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-275669AI.pdf. The FCC used anony-
mous package bidding procedures to auction the C Block licenses together "in order to assist
bidders that are seeking to create a nationwide footprint." Id. 700 MHz Report and Order,
supra note 164, 1 21; see John Eggerton, Spectrum Auction Update: FCC Meets Floor Price
for C Block, BROAD. & CABLE, Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/
CA652758 I.html ("The [FCC] met its floor price for a block of 50-state wireless-spectrum
licenses (the C block) that can be used for a new national network.").
167 VolP refers to the protocol for transmission of voice data over the Internet, i.e., the
process that allows cheap or even free "Internet calling" services-such as eBay Inc.'s
popular Skype. See David Pogue, Overseas Calls Made Cheap, if Not Easy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2007, at C1.
'68 See 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164, 189-230 (discussing the back-
ground and reasons for the open platform requirement on the C Block); In re Skype Com-
munications S.A.R.L., Petition to Confirm A Consumer's Right to Use Internet Communi-
cations Software and Attach Devices to Wireless Networks, Petition of Skype Communica-
tions S.A.R.L., RM- 11361 (Feb. 20, 2007), (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing
System) [hereinafter Skype Petition] (requesting that the FCC enforce Carterfone in the
wireless industry and create open wireless networks); see also Delaney & Sharma, Bigger
Plans for Mobile Phones, supra note 131 (discussing Google's efforts in the 700 MHz auc-
tion and the company's push for open wireless networks); discussion of Google's OHA
supra Part III.B.2.
169 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164, 191. These ideas are somewhat analo-
gous to the FCC broadband wireline Internet open access policies:
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice; (2) con-
sumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the
needs of law enforcement; (3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal
devices that do not harm the network; and (4) consumers are entitled to competition
among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers.
Id. 194; In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommu-
nications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropri-
ate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Cable Facilities; Policy
Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 (Aug. 5, 2005).
170 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164 (citing Skype Petition, supra note 168, at
9-12).
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ket forces are generally the most efficient means to foster competition."' With
this in mind, the FCC decided to impose open platform requirements exclu-
sively on the C Block licenses, a unique experiment to allow the FCC to ex-
plore potential consumer benefits "without unduly burdening existing services
and markets."'72 The FCC summarized the C Block requirements as follows:
The licensees of the Upper 700 MHz Band C Block of spectrum will be required to
provide a platform that is more open to devices and applications. This would allow
consumers to use the handset of their choice and download and use the applications of
their choice in this spectrum block, subject to certain reasonable network management
conditions that allow the licensee to protect the network from harm. 73
Bidders in the 700 MHz auction quickly met the $4.6 million reserve price
the FCC required before the open access policies would attach to the C
Block.74 The FCC therefore will implement open application and open device
provisions on the C Block in accord with two of Google's requested policies
and the two Carterfone principles articulated by Skype. What concerns critics
is the language that hedges the open access obligation, "subject to certain rea-
sonable network management conditions . . . to protect the network from
harm.""' The network operator could abuse this limitation, diluting the true
effect of the open platform requirements akin to the way AT&T justified its
allegedly network-protecting attachment tariffs prior to Carterfone.'76 The
FCC, however, has announced that if the winning network operator fails to
interpret and apply the scope of this network-protection language properly, the
Commission will step in to enforce fair and objective open platform stan-
dards.'77
On March 20, 2008, the FCC announced that Verizon Wireless, a non-OHA
carrier, was the major winner in the C Block auction.' While no one can pre-
dict exactly how these open device and open applications requirements will
affect consumers under Verizon's control, analysts generally expect that con-
sumers will have much easier access to a previously-unseen range of Internet
'7' E.g., id. 9 195-230 (discussing the FCC's general preference for market forces to
foster competition and its decision to adopt open access requirements for the C Block).
172 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164, 195.
173 FCC Revises 700 MHz Rules, supra note 166; see also 700 MHz Report and Order,
supra note 164, 149, 189-230.
174 See Eggerton, supra note 166; see also 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164,
8.
175 FCC Revises 700 MHz Rules, supra note 166.
176 See Why Block C Matters, Susan Crawford Blog, http://scrawford.netblog/why-c-
matters/1 136/ (Mar. 20, 2008); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
177 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164, 99 224-25, 229-30.
178 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Statement by FCC Chairman Kevin J. Mar-
tin (Mar. 20, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-
280968Al.pdf; see also Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes; Winning Bidders An-
nounced for Auction 73, Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R 4572, 4645 (Mar. 20, 2008).
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content such as online banking, stock trading, mobile video, Web search en-
gines, music downloading, and even VolP calling.'79 Given the historically re-
strictive attitude of wireless carriers towards Internet content and applications,
the implications of the C Block open access requirements to the growth of
Google's Web-based advertising business specifically and to greater consumer
access to Internet content and mobile software applications generally are
monumental.
Google followed through on expectations that it would bid on the C Block to
at least the reserve price necessary to attach the open access requirements for
which it emphatically lobbied.80 Before the FCC released auction results,
speculation mounted as to how far Google would push the spectrum into un-
charted consumer-friendly waters if it won the C Block licenses.'' With the
announcement that Verizon, the largest incumbent wireless provider, won the
licenses, some critics expressed concern that Verizon may only play lip service
to the FCC's C Block open access provisions.182 Unquestionably, however,
Verizon will have to operate under FCC-imposed open platform provisions, an
experimental scenario that the FCC, wireless carriers, handset makers, soft-
ware developers, and consumers must all examine and critique. This experi-
ment will enable the FCC to evaluate an alternative, open wireless business
model without forcing risky changes throughout the larger, turbulent wireless
industry. All those with a stake in increased openness in the wireless arena
must demand Verizon's accountability; ultimately, Verizon's network man-
agement implementation will dictate the true impact of the C Block open plat-
form experiment.8 3
At the margins, wireless carriers have undoubtedly extracted additional
profit at the expense of consumer choice. The question, again, is whether broad
Carterfone-style rules are appropriate for today's wireless market. Healthy
profits are essential for any firm to survive, compete, and innovate, especially
in a cutting-edge industry like wireless telecommunications. For example, if
Apple had been unable to subsidize the cost of first-generation iPhones through
exclusive AT&T service contracts, the iPhone may have never seen the light of
day-at least not when it did, with the technology it had, and at a marketable
179 Boles, FCC Auction May Expand Cellphone Options, Services, supra note 164. For
more on VolP, see generally Pogue, supra note 167.
180 See Sharma & Schatz, supra note 165 ("[Google] bid just high enough to trigger rules
that will force winners of [the C Block] ... to allow any mobile devices and application on
their networks.").
181 See Delaney & Sharma, Bigger Plans for Mobile Phones, supra note 131.
182 See Why Block C Matters, supra note 176 (noting inconsistencies in Verizon's state-
ments regarding open access and network protection such as certifying applications and
continuing to subsidize handsets).
183 See Brian Gardiner, FCC Auctions Ensures Open Access-If in Name Only, WIRED,
Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2008/02/open-access.
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price. The regulatory freedom that wireless carriers and handset makers enjoy
has fueled exponential technological innovation in a market that is nowhere
near mature. And as the wireless industry continues to develop, consumer
choice initiatives are quickly becoming essential competitive tools for the
firms leading the way.
IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLICATION OF BROAD-SCALE
CARTERFONE REGULATION TO TODAY'S TRANSITIONAL
WIRELESS PHONE INDUSTRY
A. An Economic Analysis
To address whether broad Carterfone-type regulation is currently appropri-
ate for the wireless phone industry, one must analyze not only the conduct of
individual firms, ' 4 but also the competitiveness and structure of the market as a
whole. Through these lenses, it becomes clear that the wireless carrier market
in the U.S. is rapidly evolving and highly competitive, in stark contrast to the
price-regulated, vertically integrated carrier and equipment AT&T monopoly
of the pre-Carterfone era. In its 2007 Wireless Competition Report, the FCC
concluded that the wireless phone market was healthy and effectively competi-
tive, an industry that has experienced exponential subscriber growth since Con-
gress mandated in 1993 that the Commission begin drafting annual Wireless
Competition Reports. 8 The FCC consistently and emphatically recognizes the
competitiveness of the wireless industry.'86
184 See discussion supra Part III.
185 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec.
6002(b)(2)(A)(iii), § 332(c)(1)(C), 107 Stat. 312, 393 (1993); see In re Implementation of
Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and
Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services,
Twelfth Report, 23 F.C.C.R. 2241, 290-93 (Jan. 28, 2008) [hereinafter 2007 Wireless
Competition Report].
186 See generally 2007 Wireless Competition Report, supra note 185. The FCC has con-
sistently noted the competitiveness of the wireless industry in Comments and prior Wireless
Competition Reports. Commenting on the 2007 Wireless Competition Report, FCC Chair-
man Kevin Martin noted the "unprecedented growth and dramatic innovation" in the indus-
try make "wireless... the poster child for competition." Remarks of FCC Chairman Kevin




Table 1. Mobile Operator Market Share According to Number of Subscribers,
Percentage (2005)87
Number of Operators 1 2 3 4 5 Others
Australia 45.1 32.5 17.2 5.2
Austria 39.6 24.4 20.7 12 3.3
Belgium 48.3 33.4 18.3
Canada 36.4 26.9 36.7
Czech Republic 41 40 19
Denmark 41.2 23.5 21 5 9.3
Finland 65.7 4.3 18.5 11.5
France 46.8 35.9 17.3
Germany 37.3 36.8 13.6 12.3
Greece 37.4 35.6 19.4 7.6
Hungary 45 33.2 21.8
Iceland 63.6 34.3 2.1
Ireland 48.6 38 13.4
Italy 40 33.1 19.1 7.8
Japan 53 23.5 15.8 2.8 4.9
Korea 50.9 32.1 17
Luxembourg 53 40 7
Mexico 78.9 14 4 3.1
Netherlands 51.2 23 11.3 14.5
New Zealand 52.8 47.1
Norway 59.5 24.4 8 6.3 1.8
Poland 35 31 34
Portugall 46.4 38.3 15.3
Slovakia 55.5 44.5
Spain 46.1 30 23.9
Sweden 52 27.9 17 3.1
Switzerland 62.5 18.5 18.3 0.7
Turkey 63 22 13
United Kingdom 26 23.3 22.7 22.6 5.4
United States (2003) 23.6 13.9 13.8 10.0 8.1 30.6
United States (2005) 25.4 24.1 21 10.2 5 14.3
United States (2006)* 26.8 26 23 11 5.2 8
+ Secretariat estimates.
* 2007 Wireless Competition Report, supra note 184, at App. a., tbl.A4.
187 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD COMMUNI-
CATIONS OUTLOOK 2007, at 38 tbl.2.4, available at http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/
browseit/930702 1 E.PDF.
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As of 2006, AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless were the
four national U.S. wireless service providers, while major regional U.S. pro-
viders include Alitel, United States Cellular, and Leap Wireless. 8 Ninety-eight
percent of the U.S. population in July 2007, or 280 million people, lived in
counties served by three or more wireless operators.8 9 Further, 94%, or 267
million people, lived in counties served by four or more operators. 9° There
were 155 total wireless carriers operating in the United States as of 2006.'9'
Table 192 illustrates that market share among U.S. wireless carriers is substan-
tially more diverse than most other developed nations around the world.93 By
all accounts, the wireless industry is innovative and competitive; even wireless
Carterfone proponents acknowledge the industry structure as, at most, a com-
petitive oligopoly.'94
By 2006, the cellular telephone services component of the Consumer Price
Index ("CPI"), calculated on a national basis by the U.S. Department of La-
bor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, had decreased by roughly 35% since the De-
partment of Labor began tracking the statistic in December 1997.' Further,
while the overall CPI increased by 3.2% between 2005 and 2006, the cellular
188 2007 Wireless Competition Report, supra note 185, 18.
189 Id. 44.
190 Id.
191 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 187, at
35 tbl.2.1.
192 See supra table 1. Table I of this Comment is modeled after Table 1 of Ford et al. See
FORD ET AL., supra note 5, at 16 tbl. 1.
193 Particularly noteworthy is the lack of carrier diversity in France, where by law con-
sumers have the choice of purchasing wireless handsets separately from service. See
O'Brien, supra note 68. In France, one carrier serves nearly half of the country's subscrib-
ers. Supra table 1. In the United States, the two largest operators serve roughly half the
country's subscribers with the remaining market share allocated among the other 153 opera-
tors. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 187, at
35 tbl.2.1.
194 For example, Professor Wu views the wireless industry as a "textbook oligopoly."
Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 422-23.
195 2007 Wireless Competition Report, supra note 185, 198. The cellular CPI is one of
several indices calculated by the U.S. Department of Labor, and measures the average
change in the prices paid by urban consumers for cellular telephone services over time. Id.
198 n.499.
The cellular CPI includes charges from all telephone companies that supply "cellular
telephone services," which are defined as "domestic personal consumer phone ser-
vices where the telephone instrument is portable and it sends/receives signals for calls
by wireless transmission." This measure does not include business calls, telephone
equipment rentals, portable radios, and pagers.
Id. 198 n.500 (quoting the Bureau of Labor Statistics). See also Bureau of Labor Statistics,
How BLS Measures Price Change for Cellular Telephone Service in the Consumer Price
Index, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifactc.htm.
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CPI decreased roughly 0.6%.196 The FCC's 2007 Wireless Competition Report
notes that cellular-industry-wide average revenue per minute ("RPM") was
$0.07 in December 2006, unchanged from December 2005,' after declining
22% in 2005 alone." 8 Cellular RPM declined by 86%, from $0.47 to $0.07,
between December 1994 and December 2006.10 The statistics undeniably indi-
cate growing competitiveness, and even wireless Carterfone advocate profes-
sor Tim Wu states that "[t]he American wireless industry, over the last decade,
has succeeded in bringing wireless telephony at competitive prices to the pub-
lic."2"0
FCC Commissioner Robert M. McDowell, in his dissent in part to the C
Block open access requirements, outlined four principles clearly distinguishing
the current wireless phone industry from that of AT&T's pre-Carterfone mo-
nopoly.20' McDowell's comments clarify that Carferfone-style regulation is
inappropriate for industry-wide application:
First, the AT&T of the 1960's was a nearly 100-year-old government protected
and subsidized monopoly. By any measure, today's U.S. wireless service providers
lack market or monopoly power, as this Commission concluded just 10 months ago.
Second, unlike wireline voice services offered in the 1960's, today's U.S. wireless
service providers have never [vertically] integrated into the applications or equipment
markets. Third, under common antitrust analysis, today's wireless providers lack the
ability to exercise buying power over upstream handset suppliers, of which there are
many competitors, which wield significant countervailing selling power. Fourth, wire-
less service providers are not subject to price regulation in the market in which they
are alleged to have market power, which otherwise might encourage them to seek
profits in complementary markets.20 2
The Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies
("Phoenix Center"), a non-profit think tank focused on law and economics
analysis of the telecommunications industry, 203 asserts that given the stark con-
trast between today's wireless phone industry and the pre-Carterfone wireline
industry, the same FCC intervention now would be unnecessary and even
harmful.2 ° Wireless carriers are not vertically integrated like the old AT&T
196 2007 Wireless Competition Report, supra note 185, 198.
197 Id. 199.
198 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10,947, 154 (Sept. 26, 2006).
199 2007 Wireless Competition Report, supra note 185, 199.
200 Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at 389.
201 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164, at 15,571-75 (statement of FCC Com-
missioner Robert M. McDowell, approving in part, dissenting in part).
202 Id. (citations omitted).
203 See Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies, About
the Phoenix Center, http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcau.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
204 See generally FoRD ET AL., supra note 5 (finding that Carterfone-type regulation is
unnecessary for the wireless industry).
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monopoly-wireless carriers do not manufacture handsets2° 5-"[t]hus, the po-
tential for the sabotage of competing equipment manufacturers to protect an
equipment affiliate [as done by AT&T pre-Carterfone] is entirely absent in the
wireless industry."2"6 The Carterfone decision targeted the actions of a verti-
cally integrated monopolist protecting the interests of its affiliated equipment
manufacturer, and its translation to the wireless industry simply does not com-
pute on economic grounds." 7
The Phoenix Center adds to the argument against broad-based wireless Car-
terfone rules by noting the relative absence of regulation in today's wireless
phone market,0 8 asserting that "it was the presence of regulation-not its ab-
sence-that made Carterfone regulation necessary.""2 9 The Phoenix Center
wrote
the Bell System's entry deterring behavior in telephone equipment was because of the
price regulation of local telephone service. Economists recognize that it was combina-
tion of market power at the downstream level plus classic public utility-type regula-
tion that created the incentive for the Bell System to leverage and exclude entry in the
equipment sector (neither factor being present in today's wireless industry). Accord-
ingly, it was thefirm's efforts to evade regulation, not simply a monopolist's inherent
desire to protect revenue and profits, which created the incentive to sabotage and ne-
cessitated the Carterfone decision.10
The Phoenix Center posits that the substantial diversity of carriers and variety
of network "air interface" technologies21 used in the United States versus other
developed countries is due in large part to the regulatory freedom that the FCC
grants carriers. 21 2 The government policy of fostering inter-network competi-
tion gives carriers the freedom to employ the technology that is most feasible
and cost effective for the devices, services, and markets they support.2 13 Broad-
based Carterfone-style wireless phone regulations could commoditize wireless
phone service.214 Commoditization could sacrifice inter-network competition
205 See discussion supra Part II (discussing the history and the market forces leading to
the Carterfone decision).
206 FORD ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
207 See id.
208 Id. at 5-8.
209 Id. at 5.
210 Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211 "Air interface" technology refers to the standards used in the radio-based communica-
tion link between the mobile station and the active base station. See Philip J. Weiser & Dale
N. Hatfield, In Pursuit of a Next Generation Network for Public Safety Communications, 16
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 97, 140 n.107 (2007); Wu, Wireless Carterfone, supra note 19, at
415. Such technologies in use in the United States include, among others, GSM, iDEN,
EDGE, UMTS, CDMA, EVDO, EVDO-RevA, and TDMA. FoRD ET AL., supra note 5, at
14.
212 FORD ETAL., supra note 5, at 14-18.
213 Id. at 13-15.
214 Id. at 13.
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and increase already high costs of entry for carriers, thereby stifling the com-
petitive pressure on carriers to innovate, and even leading to greater industry
consolidation among wireless carriers."5
Finally, the Phoenix Center raises the practical issues of the incredible costs
and complexity associated with standardizing the wireless phone industry-a
practical requirement of an industry-wide Carterfone-style right-to-attach
rules.2 6 Engineering a "single, technical standard interface" that would allow a
handset to operate on all of the dozen network types currently deployed in the
United States would be a daunting, if not impossible, task.27 Further, the sheer
cost and legislative complexity required for the FCC to micromanage technical
interfacing between the rapidly expanding types of wireless handsets and the
evolving wireless network standards used in the United States is difficult to
imagine." 8
B. A Three-Part Response to Wireless Carterfone Proponents
An understanding of the history, market structure, and network technology
surrounding the wireline attachment problem addressed by Carterfone and its
progeny is fundamental when questioning FCC application of the policy to the
modem wireless industry. The modem oligopolistic market of non-vertically
integrated wireless carriers and handset manufacturers is far from the vertically
integrated, innovation-stifling monopoly of the former AT&T. Today's wire-
less carriers fervently compete for customers by offering superior service, net-
work speed and features, and handset technology-inter-firm competition that
was nonexistent during the pre-Carterfone era.
The wireless phone industry in the United States is in an incredible state of
flux as major carriers acknowledge consumer frustration and seek profit and
competitive advantage by implementing changes that give their customers and
third parties greater freedom and choice.2"9 The new carrier and handset open
access measures detailed here and those that inevitably will follow cast the
spotlight on handset manufacturers and software developers, who have the
215 See id. at 15 (explaining that government regulation forcing openness would likely
decrease quality and increase the price of wireless network services).
216 Innovation in the equipment industry, however, could moot this issue-multi-air
interface phones would solve the standardization problem. Developing such devices, how-
ever, would take time and considerable expense.
217 FORD ET AL., supra note 5, at 17. Current network types include AMPS, D-AMPS,
CDPD, GSM, iDEN, WIDEN, CDMA, GPRS, EDGE, W-CDMA, EVDO, and the develop-
ing 3G and 4G systems. Id.
218 See id. (noting that the FCC's Carterfone rules "take up 164 pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations and contain 77 separate diagrams.").
219 See Bryan-Low et al., supra note 113 ("The cellphone industry is undergoing one of
the most dramatic periods of change of its 25-year history.").
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freedom to create devices, applications and functionality in direct response to
consumer demands. The calls for wireless Carterfone policy brought by con-
sumers, businesses affiliated with wireless telephony, and scholars have been
essential in forcing major industry players toward pro-consumer initiatives.
Indeed, voluntary wireless open access practices by key industry players are
likely, at least in part, preemptive reactions to threats of increased regulation.2"'
All of the above demonstrates that indeed, market forces are the most efficient
means of fostering competition, a principle to which the FCC must hold fast in
light of the wireless Carterfone argument.
In regard to the experimental C Block open platform requirements, the FCC
must carefully evaluate the impact of enforcing the requirements on carriers,
handset manufacturers, software developers, and consumers in the short term.
The C Block requirements could foster service and handset innovation, but
also create unanticipated downsides. Thus, the FCC is wise to impose open
platform requirements on only a limited, experimental basis. This approach
allows the FCC, stakeholders in the wireless industry, and consumers to ob-
serve the real-world effects of the policy and continue the debate, before taking
more costly and drastic measures.22 ' Further, if Verizon successfully imple-
ments an open platform business model within the C Block spectrum, carriers
throughout the industry will likely face competitive pressure to offer similar
choices.222 Yet the news that incumbent Verizon Wireless, as opposed to a
powerful industry outsider like Google, will control the open platform-
encumbered C Block licenses must trigger particularly vigilant FCC oversight
to ensure the experiment's success.
There are three possible results of the C Block experiment: (1) Verizon fails
to implement the C Block requirements in good faith; (2) the C Block experi-
ment proves successful and the market itself moves towards greater consumer
choice; or (3) Verizon attempts to implement the requirements in good faith,
but they prove unworkable in or detrimental to the industry. First, if Verizon
fails to make a good faith effort and only pays lip service to the C Block open
platform requirements, the FCC must take action to enforce the provisions as
promised. An informed FCC decision on broad Carterfone rules is premature
until the C Block experiment is fully carried out. If the C Block experiment
and the market-based openness initiatives do not result in meaningful change
from the wireless industry status quo, the time will be ripe for FCC considera-
220 See Sharma, Verizon Wireless Unveils Open-Network Policy, supra note 153; see also
Sharma & Searcey, Verizon to Open Cell Network to Others' Phones, supra note 36.
221 See 700 MHz Report and Order, supra note 164, 205 ([T]he approach that we take





tion of industry-wide Carterfone policy. Worse yet, if the industry veers away
from increased consumer choice and converges towards a duopoly or monop-
oly,223 broad government intervention, in some form or another, will be re-
quired.
Next, if Verizon implements the C Block open platform requirements in
good faith and the policy proves successful, the FCC must defer to market
competition to spread true openness throughout the industry before considering
industry-wide implementation of Carterfone policy. This market-based solu-
tion would be far superior to the immense regulatory expense and burden of
broad-based Carterfone policy. Relatedly, the wireless market is independently
poised to move towards greater consumer choice.224 Either outcome would be
ideal for all those with a stake in the industry.
Lastly, although unlikely, if the C Block open platform requirements prove
somehow fundamentally unworkable for the network operator or undesirable to
consumers, the FCC will be forced to grant Verizon forbearance from the
rules.25 If the C Block experiment fails for these reasons, the FCC must seri-
ously question implementing any type of Carterfone rules in the future.
Regardless of the trajectory of the wireless industry in the short term, an
immediate, prescriptive, industry-wide Carterfone-style regulatory approach
by the FCC is inappropriate and unjustifiably costly. Such a policy could lead
to greater industry consolidation at the expense of product diversity, techno-
logical innovation, and consumer costs at this tumultuous point in the devel-
opment of the modem wireless phone industry."'
V. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT WIRELESS PHONE
SOFTWARE EXEMPTION
A. An Appropriate Policy Supportive of Consumer Choice and Property Rights
Consumers and other wireless choice stakeholders are making inroads be-
yond the jurisdiction of the FCC. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 ("DMCA")2.. is a U.S. copyright law that incorporates the Copyright
Treaty22 and Performances and Phonograms Treaty229 of the World Intellectual
223 This scenario is one of fundamental market failure to address consumer fairness is-
sues without government regulation.
224 See supra Part III (discussing the current wireless market).
225 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2000) (establishing procedures for petitioning the FCC for regula-
tory forbearance).
226 See discussion supra note 215 and accompanying text.
227 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of Titles 17 and 28).
228 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996,
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Property Organization ("WIPO"). 230 The DMCA criminalizes the production
and dissemination of technology, devices, or services that are used to circum-
vent any "technological measure that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected under [the DMCA]."23 Pursuant to the DMCA, the Librarian of Con-
gress ("Librarian") makes a determination every three years through a public
hearing and comment process whether any "persons who are users of a copy-
righted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely
affected by [the DMCA] in their ability to make noninfringing uses under this
title of a particular class of copyrighted works. 232 Through the rulemaking
process, proponents of a potential exemption have the burden of proof "by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been or there is likely to be a sub-
stantial adverse effect on noninfringing uses by users of copyrighted works. 233
Such exemptions to the DMCA are effective for a period of three years and
thereafter must be renewed."' Further, "[t]he existence of a previous exemp-
tion creates no presumption for consideration of a new exemption, but rather
the proponent of such an exemption must make a prima facie case in each
three-year period."2"' Following the hearing and public comment process, the
Librarian issues and publishes the exemptions for which the burden of proof
has been met, which will be recognized as noninfringing uses that will not vio-
late section 1201(a)(1)(A) of the DMCA.236
Of particular relevance is a three-year exemption to the DMCA published in
2006 by the Librarian that recognizes a narrow, noninfringing consumer use of
software circumvention to access controls on cellular phones. Specifically, the
exemption recognizes "[c]omputer programs in the form of firmware that en-
S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, available at http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocswo033.pdf.
229 World International Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203, available at http://
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/wppt/pdf/trtdocs-wo034.pdf.
230 The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") is a specialized agency of
the United Nations with the stated purpose "to encourage creative activity, [and] to promote
the protection of intellectual property throughout the world." Convention Establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization, pmbl., July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828
U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
treaties/en/convention/pdf/trtdocswo029.pdf.
231 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
232 § 1201(a)(1)(C).
233 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,473 (Nov. 27, 2006).
234 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B); see Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copy-
right Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,472 (noting
that the exemption for noninfringing uses exists for three years).
235 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,473.
236 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D).
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able wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telephone communi-
cation network, when circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of
lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone communication network." '237 This
DMCA exemption grants a wireless service subscriber freedom from copyright
infringement liability when bypassing or removing the locking software in-
stalled on the handset by the carrier in order to lawfully connect the handset to
any wireless network.38 The immediate effect of the exemption is additional
legal reinforcement of the already growing phenomenon of businesses and
consumers unlocking handsets in order to take the devices to alternate carri-
ers.
239
The exemption's proponents were The Wireless Alliance 24" and Robert
Pinkerton,24 ' an individual who traveled frequently for business and found that
on such trips cell phone locking often restricted use of his handset in various
locations.2 The proponents stated that carriers use various software locks to
prevent customers from connecting to a competitor's network, "even after all
contractual obligations to the original wireless carrier have been satisfied. 243
Circumventing such locks, they argue, solely for the purpose of lawfully con-
necting a consumer-owned phone to a competitor's network, does not pose a
copyright infringement issue related to the carrier-provided software on the
phone.2 " The Librarian accepted the proponents' arguments, finding under a
review of the factors set forth in section 1201 (a)(1)(C)(i)-(v)245 that an exemp-
237 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(5) (2007).
238 See id.
239 See supra Part Ill.
240 The Wireless Alliance is a for-profit wholesaler of new, used, and refurbished cell
phones and related equipment based in Boulder, Colorado. See The Wireless Alliance,
About the Wireless Alliance, http://www.thewirelesalliance.com/about.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2008). The company places a strong emphasis on environmentally-friendly, low-
cost cellular solutions. See id.
24 1 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,476; see Jennifer Granick, Commen-
tary, Cellphones Freed! Poor Suffer?, WIRED, Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.wired.com/politics/
law/commentary/circuitcourt/2006/12/72241 (stating that the author of the article asked for
the rule on behalf of the Wireless Alliance and Robert Pinkerton).
242 See Granick, supra note 241.
243 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476.
244 Id.
245 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i)-(v) (2006).
In conducting such rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine-
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and educa-
tional purposes;
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures
applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research;
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tion was warranted:
[C]ircumvention of software locks to connect to alternative mobile telecommunica-
tions networks [would not] be likely to have any effect on the market for or value of
copyrighted works. The reason that these four factors appears to be neutral is that in
this case, the access controls do not appear to actually be deployed in order to protect
the interests of the copyright owner or the value or integrity of the copyrighted work;
rather, they are used by wireless carriers to limit the ability of subscribers to switch to
other carriers, a business decision that has nothing whatsoever to do with the interests
protected by copyright. 24
No party gave timely and substantive opposition to the proposed exemp-
tion.2 47 The copyright owners who did oppose the exemption were owners of
music, sound recordings, and audiovisual works offered for downloading to
handsets.2 4' The Librarian stated that "[t]he record on this issue was fairly in-
conclusive 2 49 yet regardless, the proponents made a sufficient showing that the
proposed exemption would not "permit unauthorized access to these works.
Rather, the exemption [was] sought for the sole purpose of permitting owners
of cellular phone handsets to switch their handsets to a different network."25
Long after the conclusion of the comment and hearing period in this rulemak-
ing, the Librarian received comments opposing the proposed exemption from
CTIA-The Wireless Association2 1 ("CTIA") and TracFone Wireless, Inc.
("TracFone").252 The Librarian admonished these parties for their tardiness;
since they presented no justifiable excuse, the Librarian could not consider
their late submissions in opposition to the proposed exemption."
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value
of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
Id.
246 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476.
247 See id. at 68,476-77.
248 Id. at 68,476.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. CTIA-The Wireless Association is a nonprofit trade association that advocates
on behalf of wireless service providers, manufacturers, wireless data and internet compa-
nies, and other contributors to wireless telephony. CTIA-The Wireless Association, About
Us, http://www.ctia.org/aboutCTIA/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
252 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476. TracFone Wireless, a subsidiary of
Amdrica M6vil, S.A.B. de C.V., the fourth largest cell phone service provider in the world,
is the largest prepaid wireless service provider in the United States. TracFone Wireless, Inc.,
About Us, http://www.tracfone.com/about.jsp?nextPage=about.jsp&task=about (last visited
Sept. 28, 2008).
253 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,477.
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B. The DMCA in Practice
The exact legal contours of the DMCA exemption have not been fully tested
and defined; however, the language of the exemption already has proved its
appropriate practical protective reach. A literal reading of the exemption makes
clear that while consumers and software providers who circumvent phone
locking software to connect lawfully to a network can expect immunity from
copyright liability, carriers and handset makers remain free to sell locked, sub-
sidized phones and are not forced to aid in facilitating handset unlocking in any
way."' The DMCA exemption only grants limited copyright infringement pro-
tection and leaves unaffected any contractual or other liability a consumer may
have to a carrier, such as termination fees.255 Yet the policy is an appropriate
response to today's oligopolistic wireless market-it grants consumers greater
choice while not unduly strong-arming producers or restraining innovation in a
competitive and drastically changing market where profit and competition
drive technological change.
TracFone Wireless was the only wireless provider to directly oppose the
DMCA wireless phone software exemption outside of the blanket representa-
tion of CTIA.256 TracFone was late to submit its exemption opposition, thereby
preventing the Librarian from considering its argument. Regardless, in
TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, the company secured a permanent injunction
preventing just the sort of handset unlocking that it feared." 7
As a prepaid cellular phone provider, TracFone sells handsets at a loss and
then makes up the loss through prepaid phone service. 58 Defendants in the
Dixon suit acquired and solicited other people to acquire bulk quantities of
TracFone prepaid phones at retail outlets and then unlocked the phones to sell
them overseas, resulting in substantial losses to Tracfone.259 The court held that
defendants' relatively unusual actions were well beyond the scope of the
DMCA exemption, as their purpose was to resell the handsets for a profit,
254 See Bryan Gardiner, Carriers Split over Cell Phone Unlocking, PC MAGAZINE, Dec.
8, 2006, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2704,20693 18,00.asp [hereinafter Gardiner, Car-
riers Split]. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(5) (2007).
255 See Gardiner, Carriers Split, supra note 254.
256 See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,477 (Nov. 7, 2006).
257 See TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
TracFone succeeded in this and ten similar suits in five other states in securing injunctions
and settlements against resellers on claims other than DMCA violations, such as "trademark
and copyright infringement, unfair competition, tortuous interference with business relation-
ships, false advertising, harm to business reputation, civil conspiracy and unjust enrich-
ment." David Kravets, Ruling Allows Cell Phone Unlocking, but Teleco Sues Anyway,
WIRED, Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/08/tracfone.
258 Kravets, supra note 257.
259 Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
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rather than "for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone
communication network. '260 Therefore, in granting TracFone an injunction, the
court did not "address the validity of the exemption or the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment. '26' Apparently satisfied with the outcome of the suit,
TracFone subsequently withdrew a suit filed directly against the Librarian that
sought to challenge the validity of the wireless phone DMCA exemption.262 In
the end, the DMCA exemption does not appear to be harming TracFone's le-
gitimate business: In 2007, the first full year following the exemption's enact-
ment, TracFone added 1.6 million subscribers in the United States, finishing
the year with 20.5% more subscribers than it had at the end of 2006.63
C. An Analysis of the DMCA Wireless Phone Software Exemption Policy
The Dixon decision clearly illustrates the wisdom behind the carefully
worded language of the DMCA exemption; the court accurately construed the
scope of the exemption with respect to consumers' rights, while simultane-
ously recognizing a carrier's legitimate business model. Wireless phone recy-
clers champion the DMCA exemption as serving its purpose by legitimizing
their businesses.264 The Wireless Alliance, one of the driving forces behind the
exemption, recycles, unlocks, and resells about 650,000 used phones annu-
ally. 65 Wireless phone recyclers serve a vital role by offering price-conscious
consumers a legitimate supply of older, lower-cost phones outside of the tradi-
tional cell phone "bundling" sales model.2"
Under a typical cell phone service contract, as opposed to prepaid service,
the carrier offers service and a handset bundled under a term service contract.
2 67
The customer receives the handset upfront at a heavily discounted price, while
the carrier recoups the discount through subsidies built into the customer's
monthly service rate. 68 One complaint against carriers' bundling practice is
that a consumer with a recycled phone seeking wireless service often pays ex-
actly the same service rate as consumers who purchase a subsidized handset
260 Id. at 1238 (quoting Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protec-
tion Systems for Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,472).
261 Id.
262 See Kravets, supra note 257; see also Complaint at 1-2, TracFone Wireless, Inc. v.
Billington, No. 06-22942 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2006).
263 AMERICA M6VIL, S.A.B. DE C.V., AMtRiCA M6VIL's FOURTH QUARTER OF 2007 Fi-
NANCIAL AND OPERATING REPORT 4 (2008), available at http://www.americamovil.com/
docs/reportes/eng/2007_4.pdf. At the end of 2007, TracFone had 9.5 million subscribers. Id.
264 Kravets, supra note 257.
265 Id.
266 See id.




bundled with the service.269 Given the umbrella protection of the DMCA and a
growing prevalence of service-only offerings such as Verizon's Any Apps,
Any Device, inter-firm competition likely will lead to lower-priced service
plans for customers with recycled handsets.27 Regardless of when or how the
growing recycled phone market will affect service plan pricing, it provides
today's customers a wider array of used handsets with features and technology
that they otherwise would not have been able to afford when new.
The high-technology wireless handset market and its inherent early adopters
create a steady chum of units suitable for the next wave of users. The DMCA
exemption further facilitates consumers' ability to take these handsets to the
carrier of their choice. As stated by Roger L. Kay, founder and president of
Endpoint Technologies Associates,27' a market research firm, "I do think [the
DMCA exemption] will eventually have an impact on prices and competition
between the carriers. If there's a certain motivation to switch [carriers], and if
you reduce the friction to switch ... people are going to start doing it." '272 In-
deed, Verizon's Any Apps, Any Device initiative, Google's OHA and Android
open-source software platform, and Apple's iPhone SDK are all examples of
powerful industry players willingly taking the right to attach and open access
principles of the DMCA exemption even further. Open-network initiatives,
combined with a robust recycled handset market, will expand greatly consumer
choice and provide another argument against broad Carterfone-style regulation
of the wireless industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FCC has initiated a bold new experiment by prescribing Carterfone-
style open access and right-to-attach provisions to the C Block licenses. All
stakeholders in the debate-the government, industry, legislators, consumers,
academics, and journalists-must remain vigilant of consumer frustration and
controversial carrier and handset manufacturer practices while the full extent of
this experiment, as well as the multitude of other recent developments in the
wireless industry, play out. FCC or legislative extension of the Carterfone
principles to the entire wireless industry, however, is presently inappropriate,
prohibitively costly, and could lead to dangerous industry consolidation at the
expense of innovation, product diversity, and consumer choice.
If firms have the freedom to choose the most efficient methods of delivering
269 See id.
270 See Gardiner, Carriers Split, supra note 254.
271 See Endpoint Technologies Associates, http://www.ndpta.com (last visited Sept. 28,
2008).
272 Gardiner, Carriers Split, supra note 254.
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all that consumers demand and consumers remain confident in their property
rights, technological innovation will flourish in this rapidly developing and
increasingly competitive market. As FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps said
to the panelists at the January 2008 "Free My Phone!" forum:
This is an exciting time in the wireless market and consumers have a lot to be looking
forward to in 2008. Cell phones allow us to leave our offices and our homes and still
be in voice contact with people who need us. The next generation of wireless handsets
should let us put the entire functionality of the modem office or home office in our
pockets. I really hope that, when I open my Wall Street Journal and Business Week in
2009, our next panelists will be telling me that the wireless marketplace is every bit as
vibrant as the rest of the consumer electronics marketplace.273
The FCC must "trust but verify" '274 the open platform requirements on the C
Block licensees as well as the immense market-driven changes now occurring
before considering broad-based wireless Carterfone regulation. As long as the
FCC avoids unnecessary regulation, tomorrow's wireless technology is guaran-
teed to exceed anything imaginable today.
273 Statement of Commissioner Copps, supra note 62. For more information on the Fo-
rum and a list of participants, see the New America Foundation, "Free My Phone!": Is
Regulation Needed to Ensure Consumer Choice?, http://www.newamerica.net/events/2008/
free myphone (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
274 Statement of Commissioner Copps, supra note 62 (paraphrasing the famous words of
the late President Ronald Reagan).
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